



London Olympic Security: National and International Lessons

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Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies,
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London Olympic Security: National and International Lessons

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Panelists:

Hubert Williams

President of the Police Foundation

Daveed Gartenstein-Roth

Director, Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies

Ellen M. Zavian

Professor of Sports Law, George Washington University

Combating Olympic Terrorism

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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: Sure. I'd like to begin by thanking Dr. Alexander for that introduction, and thanking the Potomac Institute for hosting this panel. I've long been an admirer of the Potomac Institute's work, as well as Dr. Alexander's, so it's an honor to be part of this. Now, it's bad form to begin a speech with an apology, but I'm going to begin this speech with one: my throat has been killing me all month, so if it starts to go out during this speech, I hope you'll forgive me for coughing or whatever else... I'll try not to be too gross.

So to move to the substance of matters, I want to start with a provocative question: how much did hosting the 2004 Olympics contribute to Greece's current complete and utter economic meltdown? I think the answer is actually that the Olympics were a far more significant contributor than you might think. In general, the Olympics is a very, very expensive event to host-- we all know that. But you can see costs that are channeled into hosting the Olympics as investment in a city's future. Those who have been to cities that have hosted the Olympics in the past 20, 30 years, and have paid attention to development patterns, can clearly see that. 1984: those Olympics helped to revitalize Los Angeles. You can still see the footprints of the Olympics there quite clearly: stadiums being put to good use, parks that were created. In 1988, the Seoul, South Korea Olympics: also significant in terms of economic development. 1996, Atlanta: you can get a very clear sense of the downtown's revitalization through the Games. 2000 in Sydney, the same thing.

But the Greece Olympics faced a double disadvantage which could not be foreseen when they won the bid in 1997. The first disadvantage was that after they won that bid, you had the 9/11 attacks. Suddenly security needs skyrocketed. They budgeted about \$1.5 billion for the entire Olympics. I'm not including the development of sports venues and infrastructure projects, but Greece's cost estimate for actually hosting that event was originally \$1.5 billion. Unfortunately, security itself ended up costing about as much as the entire budget that they'd put in place for hosting the Olympics. And the other problem Greece faced, another thing that was unforeseeable, was that in 2008 the global economy collapsed. So the return on Greece's investment in the Olympics ended up being far, far less than expected. Overall, Greece has many more economic problems than just the Olympics, but the Games were a contributor, and a bigger contributor than we would think.

The reason I begin with this point is because when I think about the Olympics and terrorism, the main lens I look at this through is an economic lens. The major argument in the book I published last year that Dr. Alexander mentioned, *Bin Laden's Legacy*, is that what al-Qa'ida's strategy is really about is economics. This was always important to Osama Bin Laden, since before he declared war on the United States. He first cut his teeth in the Afghan-Soviet War, and his perspective was that this war had brought down the Soviet Union: that not only had he defeated a super power on the battlefield, but also he caused its collapse.

Now, if you think through the logic of that argument, it clearly points to the importance of economics, because nobody would contend that leaving Afghanistan caused the Soviet Union to

fall. Rather, if that war were a major causal factor, the way you get from it to the Soviet Union's fall is that the costs imposed by the Afghan-Soviet War prevented the Soviet Union from adapting to other problems that it faced, stopped it from adapting to a major grain crisis, stopped it from adapting to the collapse in the worldwide price of oil (which hurt the Soviet Union because it was a major oil exporter, and very dependent on the then-high oil prices). Bin Laden said quite clearly in his public speeches that this war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse.

Now, the war al-Qa'ida has waged against the U.S. and the West has gone through a number of phases. Just as the financial collapse affected a wide variety of things, including the expected return that Greece thought it would get from the 2004 Olympics, it also affected al-Qa'ida's strategy. The current phase of this strategy has been articulated in what I see as a significant document, an issue of *Inspire*, the English language online magazine of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula that was published back in 2010. It illustrates some of the differences in how we view this war versus how al-Qa'ida views it.

This was a commemorative issue meant to celebrate a plot. That plot had occurred in October 2010. It was a plot in which bombs disguised as ink cartridges were put on two planes – one a FedEx plane and one a UPS plane. What might be odd about this from our perspective is that the group would issue a commemorative issue of the magazine to celebrate this plot, because from the way we look at it, this was a failed plot. They got the bombs on board both planes, but ultimately Saudi Arabian intelligence was able to alert U.S. authorities, and the bombs were found in Dubai and Britain's East Midlands Airport. For Britain it was a harrowing process. They even had screened the package with the bomb in it, and had cleared it for take-off. British officials were only able to locate the bomb when officials called from Dubai with precise instructions about how to discern the bomb.

But that harrowing experience aside, we looked at this as a failed plot, yet al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula had a commemorative issue of their magazine devoted to it. Why? Because to them, all they needed to do was get the bomb on board the plane. Anwar al-Awlaki, the late external operations leader of the group, wrote in *Inspire* that blowing up the cargo planes “would have made us pleased, but according to our plan and objectives, it was only a plus.” He noted that “the air freight industry is a multi-billion dollar industry. FedEx alone flies a fleet of 600 aircraft and ships an average of 4 million packages per day.” Awlaki's point is that, after AQAP showed that it could breach Western defenses, either his enemy spends billions to adapt to plots like this, or else AQAP can try it again, and eventually succeed. It's about economics: they dub this post-financial collapse phase in their strategy “the strategy of a thousand cuts.” They don't think they need to strike big. Instead, attrition can bring the enemy down under its own weight.

The reason I talk about al-Qa'ida is because when you review recent security events related to the Olympics, we can see that the threat of al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida fellow travelers (those who aren't affiliated with the group but subscribe to its ideology) looms large in the eyes of security officials. To be clear, this is not the only kind of terrorism that there are concerns about for the Olympics. There are concerns about far left terrorism, something illustrated by recent anarchist incidents in Greece, and far right terrorism, as illustrated by Anders Breivik and also the 1996 Olympic bombing carried out by Eric Rudolph. You could have nationalist terrorism, although I think IRA attacks are particularly unlikely. But the threat of Islamist terrorists, those affiliated with Al-Qadea or sharing its ideology, has to be at the top of the list of concerns.

You have the recent reports of an alleged militant thought to have fought in Somalia for Shabaab who was wearing an electronic tracking device, who went through Olympic Park five different times even though he was told to keep clear of that area. This incident is not as frightening a story as the press has made it out to be: if you're looking at potential attackers, I would be less concerned about a guy who is wearing a tracking device than someone who isn't. But you also

had an incident in June where two Muslim converts were arrested on suspicion of planning to attack the Olympic canoeing venue. In early July there were two separate anti-terror operations that netted 14 arrests. Clearly, when you look at the combination of presence, persistence, and capabilities, terrorism by al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and fellow ideological travelers is the key kind of possible political violence driving current anti-terrorism spending at the Games.

The expense of security has become so routine to us, but its enormity has to be noted. Obviously, not all expenses related to the Olympics are security related. You have to put up the venues; there are infrastructure upgrades in all sorts of places, including the airports. But we can see that these security expenses are very high. You have a security force of over 50,000 people. 18,200 soldiers have been called up, a higher number than expected because of the failures of a security contractor, G4S, to provide sufficient man power. You have, in addition to direct costs, the perception of a city under siege due to these measures: things like 17.5 km of electric fence that surrounds Olympic Park, constant surveillance by closed circuit television cameras, and six surface-to-air missiles on downtown buildings. Londoners love to complain, and there have been a lot of complaints about the Olympics. But one has to say, there's some validity to these complaints.

We've reached a point where the threat of terrorism, and the massive way it will drive up our costs for events like this, is taken as a given. That being said, it's not as though there's an easy fix. Even if you didn't have the threat of terrorism, security outlays would be quite large for an event like this. You still have concerns about crime and crowd control. And even if we didn't have a "global war on terror" and a major transnational non-state foe like al-Qa'ida, you still have other threats of terrorism: think 1972 Munich, 1996 Atlanta.

Ultimately, as I said, there's no easy fix, but looking for ways to reduce these costs in the future is vital. To that extent, the areas I'd most applaud our current efforts are where we've been able to combine skill sets, make security multilateral. It's notable that Interpol has been playing a role. They've been keeping an eye out for trouble, looking at possible travel to London by fugitives or terror suspects; looking for lost passports that may be used by people who are trying to steal an identity. We need to create economies of scale, so not every country that hosts the Olympics has to rebuild this entire security apparatus again and again. In some capacity, the U.S. is also providing assistance.

But when we look at this strategically, when we look at the Olympics and broader implications, keeping in mind Al-Qa'ida's strategy and the way economics figures in it is important. We're going to have to keep on hosting these massive events moving forward despite the threat of violent non-state actors. Thanks.

Hubert Williams: I think I'd like to begin my discussions more from a general perspective and then focus in on some of the issues. We all know that to be effective in dealing with terrorism, we have to have law enforcement agencies coordinating their efforts. We know that the military and police working together can have an effect, but we wonder, when we think about what happened in Colorado, how we can really take stronger measures to prevent terrorist attacks. You remember the Oklahoma situation. I'd just like to lay out a couple of basic things. One is that the police will play a critical role in dealing with any type of terrorism. It's the police by virtue of their natural responsibilities that will be the first on the scene when an act occurs. But I don't believe that it's within the strategic efforts that this war on terror is going to be won, nor with the technology. Now, with the Olympics, you know, we commend the Metropolitan Police Department. They have a good department. They have cameras and they have a lot of good

technology. In our country, we focused a lot on 9/11, the aftermath of 9/11, and preventing another 9/11 from occurring. Airplanes were flown into buildings as bombs and 3,000 people died as a result of those aircrafts crashing into buildings. So, a lot of what we've done to address the issue of terrorism has been in response to that. We've strengthened our security at airports. We now have security on our airplanes. But then, 500,000 people that walk across our borders every year. 500,000 to 800,000. If you wanted to come into America, you wouldn't necessarily do it by an airplane and you wouldn't have to bring your bombs with you or your weapons because you can get them all here. The shooting in Colorado occurred with an AK-47. In 1994, the law enforcement organizations throughout the United States united to try and deal with the issue of gun violence. We are uniting again today. As a result of that, the Brady Bill was passed. Assault weapons were banned in the United States. You could not import them into this country as a result of those efforts. Machine guns were banned. "Cop killer" bullets were banned. Time has passed. Things have changed. There was a provision attached to that legislation that caused a sunset after a period of ten years. Now the guy in Colorado got his weapons legally., but he could not have gotten those weapons legally if in fact that ban was still in effect. So, one of the things I'm suggesting is that you don't necessarily need to bring any weapons into these countries, clearly not into America, because all the things you need are right here. Another thing. We held a national conference four years ago dealing with the issue of immigration because the law enforcement leaders in our country had not spoken out on the immigration issue and all we had was elected public officials speaking to this question of what the police should do about suspected illegal immigrants in the country. We went around in border communities. We held focus groups. We found out that the police were extraordinarily concerned about the enforcement of immigration laws and one of the reasons they were concerned about the enforcement of these laws, not that the laws should not be enforced, but for the police to enforce these laws, is because it provokes a kind of fear deep in the heart of every one of these immigrants that they're gonna get deported. Even if I would bet on this one, even if they saw a bomb being constructed in the backyard, they would go in their house and pull the shades down for fear if they reported anything they are going to get deported as illegal immigrants. 85% of the immigrant families in this country are mixed. Some members of these families are legal residents, others are illegal immigrants. So, whether it's the United States or whether it's London, England, or anywhere else, I think that strength of our effort to deal with terrorism is going to be predicated on the capabilities that we have on building bonds and relationships with the people and the communities that we service. Every police leader in the United States now knows the importance of establishing these relationships. I mean, look. Community-oriented policing will focus on the people that live in the community that are subject to the results of the terrorism and the crime. They have to be partners with the law enforcement community to to prevent and deter crime in their community. No institution or entity can do that alone, and without this kind of support for the institutions of law enforcement it's going to be extraordinarily difficult for us to effectively address the issue of terrorism. So one of the things that we've got to do whether it's here or London, whether the focus is on the Olympics or anything else we've got to find ways to strengthen the relationship between the law enforcement organizations and the community that they serve. And now, there's been a considerably large effort made over the years in England as well as in the United States to begin to develop some capacity in this area. It's going to require that to be effective because in the police community and the intelligence community, we need information. Tens of thousands of people are going to come to visit London. One of the reasons that the city is more subject to an attack is because these are all people from different countries. If you saw people from other countries, large numbers coming in, and it was not the Olympics it would be a matter of concern. It's a matter of concern now, for security, we are concerned about

who are they? They're coming from the outside, but terrorism doesn't have to be external; terrorism can be internal. The Oklahoma bombing proved that, and a lot of us in the law enforcement community are fearful that Colorado is going to produce copycats, and they're going to expose America to greater hazards and dangers. And I can imagine that those people who were in that theatre felt the same as the people that were captured in the building on 9/11. You're trapped, you can't get out, bullets are flying all over the place, people are bleeding and getting hit and getting killed; they had to feel the same way. So there's a lot that has to be done, and I guess my argument is that you will never get this problem resolved by intelligence alone. And nor can you get at it through technology or a strategic approach where you've got people at the right places. It's going to take a combination of all that coordination of the law enforcement organizations and the military, sources of information, we've been trying to do that throughout the United States, coordinate information, we have these fusion centers in which we're working on that right now. And I think that the thing that we've got to do is build a greater capacity to work with communities; and what does that mean? It means that number one, we've got to understand more about the culture and the traditions of these different communities. Now, in Afghanistan when we have our search teams going out, those search teams have a woman soldier in there with them. That's a fairly recent development. They used to go in a house and anyone who'd constitute a threat they'd get searched, man or woman. But the moment a man touches a woman in Islam, then it's a whole other world, a powder keg that you'd be setting off. And we've done a lot of that in our interactions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We've got to learn about the culture of the people that we're engaged with; we've got to establish relationships with the people in these communities; and we've got to build positive bonds with them in areas of mutual interest. I think with the respect to terrorism question, the big key for us is prevention before the situation actually occurs. Now as I said from the outset that, in my view, the law enforcement community and the military intelligence people have been doing a very credible job; as far as I'm concerned, a great job. But I don't think that effectiveness in these areas will constitute any resolution of these problems that we're faced with. We've got to find a better way to build bonds and relationships with the community where people see that their interests and their safety and security requires joint participation with the people that are responsible for safety and security in those neighborhoods. So that the police that had that responsibility and the people that are subject to these problems have to create partnerships to work together to prevent crime to deal with the issue of terrorism. **And yes** we do need to make some notes that these guns are an eminent threat. Second amendments rights, I think every police officer supports second amendment rights, but is there any limitation to the weapons that people can have? Why do you need, a drum case, that holds a hundred rounds of ammunition? Shouldn't we become suspect when somebody purchases on the internet 6000 rounds of ammunition? Why do we have a federal law that requires background checks for anybody purchasing a weapon from a gun dealer, and 40% of the American people today that get those weapons, they get them outside of the gun dealers, and there are no background checks. Background checks are designed to focus on 2 things: the criminal element and the mental factors. We can't have all these guns with all these people who are borderline crazy together; that's a lethal combination. We've got to figure out a way to deal with it. So let me just say, in closing, Yonah, that I think that the big thing that we've got to be getting to do with respect to these areas in which we want to strengthen our ability to deal with the terrorism; we've got to build better bonds and relationships with the community, this doesn't mean nation building, I'm not arguing for that case, but I'm arguing that the intelligence is related to the information that the people have, and their willingness to give to those people in authority. And we can't tap that information if they're hostile to us because they see us as a threat as opposed to somebody that's there to help them. Thank you.

Ellen Zavian: . Under U.S. law, terrorism is defined as the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. for the purpose of intimidation or coercion or ransom. The British law in 1989, prior to 2011, defines terrorism as the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear. This definition drastically changed after the 9/11 attacks, but Britain still included the government and the threat to government as a major issue when defining terrorism. So when I began taking a deeper look into the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and how they go about dealing with security. I think the prior remarks on the economic side are dead on. The amount of money that the Greek Olympic games spent on security was the total money that the Atlanta Olympic games spent on hosting the entire games. So if you can put that in perspective, now the Olympics yes, they cost a lot of money to put on, the question is will the security amount deter countries from even bidding for the Olympics. At this point, we believe yes.

The U.S. is looking to put a bid for the winter games or 2 summer games from now and one of the top issues is determining what city. Originally, we were thinking about Washington, DC (DC lost a previous bid), but we need to address whether DC can even afford the security costs that would apply. Since DC is a top target of terrorist, the security costs would be well above the amount needed at a smaller lessor known city. So now it is a thought process, of where is the best place in the country to think from a security standpoint and a cost standpoint (no longer just focusing on the location with the best sporting venues).

On that note, I wanted to raise a couple of things on how the sports industry deals with this issue. Sporting facilities are labeled as “soft targets”. Originally when thought *soft* I was like wow sports soft, these two words never go together. It really means quite the opposite, obviously. It means an increased risk for terrorist attacks. So when we look at the over 10,000 athletes coming in from 204 countries competing in 26 different sports along with a million+ people attending the games, we really have to think about who are the terrorists and let us not forget that the athletes themselves can be the terrorists, as well. I know a lot of people think how is this possible but I really think we need to look at everyone who is coming in, from the vendors to the independent contractors, including the attendees that are interested in watching the sports as well.

So what are we doing in the U.S.? Professional Leagues, like MLB, sanctioning bodies, like NASCAR, the players associations, like the NFLPA, and college institutions, like the NCAA, have really joined forces in the past few years and discussed how are we going to handle this as a team because we have similar issues. When we are talking about aggregating, we are focused on pooling resources. This is not only happening at the professional levels. The risk assessors in the sports industry, specifically the managers of the facilities, headed by a group called the International Association of the Assembly Managers, the IAAM, have also been working with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on creating online tutorials for managers across the country who put on sporting events to take terrorism awareness training. I definitely predict that this training will continue and develop particularly online and eventually be expanded to stand alone sports terrorism conferences.

The other issue that is sort of interesting to me is the security status at Yankees Stadium. It is the first of any sporting facility in our country to secure a Safety Act Certificate. The Safety Act is the nickname for the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act. This Safety Act really aims to promote the creation deployment and use of anti-terrorism technologies and practices within facilities. It is important to note that up until now, this Act has not been applied to sports facilities. Yankees Stadium certificate means that a fan attending the game will

know that the facility has to continue to meet certain security standards to maintain their certificate. Their certificate expires in 2017 but during the time period, they must continually oversee the security efforts, processes, and continue to maintain them, improve them, upgrade them and so forth. So one of the things that I think the sports and leagues are looking at when obtaining this certificate is to lower their insurance premiums. One must ask the question, "Is it about protecting the fan or is it about lowering the team's insurance costs?" So were getting into the economic side again.

The other important news is the NFL itself received the same certificate in 2008, but the NFL's certificate does not apply to the team level. The teams are still required to get their own certificate. The NFL has it for any NFL facility that they own, like if they own a new facility in Los Angeles. It also applies to the events they manage, like the SuperBowl. In the near future, look for other governing organizations to seek the same protection. For example, the NCAA only runs the championship games, so they will seek certification for post-season games and the Universities would have to go after their certificates individually for all other games.

For right now, the NFL is the only professional sports league that has obtained their certificate. Since the Safety Act was originally drafted for entities like the New York Stock Exchange and the Airports, the sports organization are just starting to catch on. They see it as a win-win situation. Spend some money on security measures while eliminated your risk of being sued by the victims of a terrorist attack and decrease your insurance premiums. In addition, the Act also allows the courts to dismiss lawsuits against those entities that have the certificate or the technology companies that produce the anti-terrorist products that are installed/utilized.

In sum, it is really eliminating the risk (or costs) that an action would be brought by victims of any kind of terrorist act. This is a new reality that I will begin to incorporate into my teachings. Going forward, I definitely see a trend on expending upon the risk management section of my teachings. It used to be half a class, now it's a full class and now it's moving to one and a half. Our students who are seeking to my managers of facilities or put on events will need to learn how to complete a risk assessment from a high security standpoint. Currently, this is not taught. If you look at any sports law book, it still has case law and it looks at risk assessment as any other assessment, whether you have a tort or an intentional tort or negligence. In sum, I think this is something that has sparked an interest in me coming here today.

The next important topic to discuss concerns the Federal and State immunity statutes which immunizes States and the Federal Government from getting sued. When you look at a facility, the facility can be presumed to be owned by a private entity, but it's quite often held by bond holders and provided extensive tax breaks. For instance, a team owner may rent the stadium from the city for one dollar. If this is the case, when a terrorist attack occurs at a sporting event, the government would be immune from any liability under the immunity. Perhaps this is something the sports industries wanted and obtained it under the Security Act.

Beyond the Security Act, the IOC also has an immunity clause in their athlete contracts. The athletes, in order to compete at the Olympic games, must sign away their rights to sue the IOC (and any affiliated associations) if injury should occur due to a terrorist attack. In addition, the insurance coverage for the athletes does have a similar immunity clause, but they do pay out a minimum. Specifically, an athlete under the USOC's insurance plan has a maximum accidental and medical benefit of \$25,000, subject to a \$250 per accident deductible and accidental death maximum of \$250,000 per athlete. So should something occur in the athletic facility, the village and so forth, their heirs, if there were killed, would receive \$250,000 under the Olympic insurance.

In addition, the athletes also sign a second contract, a waiver. These waivers are sort of interesting. If you go to Virginia, the courts have looked at waivers and said we do not uphold waivers. We do not think they notify the participants sufficiently therefore, we don't look at waivers as indemnifying you, the facility owner or event manager, from liability. But this does not deter the IOC from requiring the athletes to waive their rights to sue, for ANYTHING. I will just read one sentence from the waiver agreement: "I knowingly and freely assume all risks, known or unknown, even if arising from the negligence of the releases or others." That's it. That is very broad. I don't know if that would be upheld in a court of law, a court of arbitration or a non-US court. The jurisdiction is not certain since the athletes are on foreign soil.

Some athletes might seek coverage under Worker's Compensation laws, but that is not certain either. Some Olympic athletes are considered employees, therefore are covered by worker's compensation insurance, while other athletes are considered independent contractors, receiving no coverage.

The last two things I'll talk about is sponsorship security. A good example of this pertains to McDonalds, who has one of the biggest venues in the London Olympic Games. In the Olympic Park, they have a fifteen hundred seating dining area for anyone to utilize. As you know, in Atlanta, the Park was where the bombing took place. So, it is likely that McDonalds spent a large amount of money on security when they assembled this particular dining area. Thus, it is not all about their sponsorship fee anymore. The cost of sponsorship now must include security at their on-site venue. It is an added cost that will continue to rise.

Lastly, the International Sports Federations are exploring how can sports entities jointly deal with similar terrorist's issues and develop an insurance pool for all of the participants in the Olympic games. I hope they can succeed!

George Washington University has a lot of students over in London, being lead by Dr. Lisa Delpy-Nierotti, who heads GWU's sports management department, and I hope they return safely.