Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

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Yonah Alexander
Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

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NEW TERRORISM HOT SPOT: N. MALI & AFRICA’S SAHEL

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Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

By Yonah Alexander

One cannot fully understand the impact of rising terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel without looking back to warning signs from previous years that exploded with deadly results in January 2013 in Mali and Algeria. Among those December anniversary dates related to North, West, and Central Africa that offer historical lessons on the regional and global strategic implications are the following:

On December 21, 1988, the mid-air explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, perpetrated by a Libyan state-sponsored operation, resulted in the death of 270 passengers, mostly Americans. Although Muammar Gaddafi’s 42 years of dictatorship were replaced by a new Tripoli regime in 2011, Libyan terrorism is alive and well. This brutal reality was graphically illustrated by the killing of four US government personnel, including Ambassador John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. In fact, several days after this attack, a Libyan preacher during a Friday sermon called on the faithful to “detonate our wrath upon them” and “stab them in their main artery”.

1 Libya Al-Hurra TV, September 14, 2012
Subsequently in September, other violent assaults on American embassies in Cairo, Tunis, Sana’a, and Khartoum, as well as mob protests directed at other US diplomatic missions, occurred.

The second December anniversary date is the foiled 2009 Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Flight 253, carrying 278 civilians and crew from Amsterdam to Detroit. The arrested perpetrator Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a Nigerian terrorist trained by the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen) failed to fully ignite an explosive device strapped to his body and blow-up the American aircraft as it prepared to land. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which traces its origin to the merger in 2009 of Saudi and Yemeni Al-Qaeda core associates, followed up this failure with another when bombs embedded in printer cartridges were intercepted in October 2010.

In January 2013 — Al-Qaeda-linked extremists and their associates in northern Mali tried to seize the country’s capital, Bamako, spurring a timely French military intervention that gained international support, and in turn sparked a deadly response and hostage showdown at an Algerian natural gas facility in the Sahara that took the lives of 37 foreigners, including four Americans. In just a matter of weeks, the terrorism threat level that had been rising in North Africa and the Sahel since September 11, 2001 soared, and what many considered only a regional problem, metastasized into a crisis of global implications.

These real and potential tragedies take on even greater concern when seen against the backdrop of the global terrorism threat of Al-Qaeda and its local affiliates and associates in Africa and other regions. Three major terrorist groups are particularly significant: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. Alarmingly, AQIM published a communiqué on September 18, 2012, in which it urged Muslims in North Africa to emulate the Benghazi assault and to attack US diplomatic targets in their countries.

There is a growing security concern that these regional movements have expanded their reach and recruiting to other militants and groups across the Maghreb, Sahel, and elsewhere, including southern Algeria, northeastern Mali, Niger, northern Nigeria, and Somalia.

In December 2012, the respected CNA Strategic Studies reported that “There is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali.”

In northern Mali, Al-Qaeda along with Ansar Dine, AQIM, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) seized control of “an enormous territory larger than France or Texas — almost exactly the size of Afghanistan” — and worked for much of the year to consolidate a virtual terrorist enclave, attracting new jihadist recruits from Sudan and other countries across the region, including the Polisario-run Tindouf camps in Algeria, and from Western countries.

They applied strict Sharia law to three population centers – Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal – which was only curtailed in late January of 2013 by the French military intervention that liberated the three cities. But the Al-Qaeda-linked militants simply retreated without much of a fight to desert and mountain hideouts from where they still infiltrate much of northern Mali and terrorist-trafficking network connections that reach across the Sahel.
More specifically, the threats of Al-Qaida’s new regional hub in northern Mali and from its associates constitute both tactical and strategic challenges. For instance, primary sources of financing of their activities include kidnappings (in some cases kidnapping is outsourced to criminals); piracy; and illicit trafficking of drugs, humans, vehicles, and other contraband goods (at times originating from Latin America onward to Africa and Europe). Intelligence reports and arrests have confirmed that AQIM has established links with Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front.

Also, the increased flow of economic migrants, combatants, and weapons through the vast unguarded porous and national borders in the region emboldens the various terrorist movements to increase their new attacks and carry out their criminal actions with impunity.

Clearly, these terrorist threats have contributed to the uncertainties of the unprecedented Arab uprisings, known as the Arab Spring, which marked its second anniversary in December. This revolutionary process began in Tunisia, continued in Egypt, exploded in Libya, and then spread to other countries, including Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere. The key question then is to what extent are Al-Qaida and other Salafi jihadist groups in the Maghreb, Sahel, and neighboring African countries already attempting to take advantage of recent events by destabilizing the region even further. Indeed, in the closing days of 2012, the Al-Malahem Foundation, media outlet of AQAP, offered $160,000 for murdering the US Ambassador in Sana’a and $23,000 for killing any American soldiers in Yemen.²

For experts and observers around the world, it is clear that an “Arc of Instability” is emerging across Africa’s Sahel which has opened a path for Al-Qaida to shift its center of gravity from Afghanistan and Pakistan to a new sanctuary and has created a potential launching pad much closer to US and European shores.

Thus, this 2013 report on terrorism updates five earlier studies. The first publication, “Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective Engagement in North Africa” (March 2009) was co-sponsored by the Conflict Management Program of Johns Hopkins University with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. This report was supported by a bipartisan panel of foreign policy experts, including former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, General (ret.) Wesley Clark, Amb. (ret.) Stuart Eizenstat, Professor I. William Zartman, and other distinguished former government officials and academics.

The panel’s report recommended that the new US administration “look around the corner,” as President Barack Obama has advocated, and engage the region more effectively to prevent the brewing security crisis from erupting globally. Additionally, the report outlined options for the United States to promote peace and prosperity, and to prevent a growing peril in North Africa. Perhaps if there had been a greater collective effort to perceive likely targets of jihadist opportunity, then the situation in Mali might have been mitigated early on. The nations of the Maghreb have long been at the crossroads of history and currently hold great potential as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West.

Moreover, the region could benefit greatly from increased regional economic integration that would make it an appealing market for Europe and the United States.

It also faces serious challenges: a firm toehold by Al-Qaida in the Sahara, inconsistent economic growth, a growing, restive young population, and regional disputes that impede economic and security cooperation, in particular the long-running dispute over the Western Sahara and the closed border between Morocco and Algeria.

Settling the Western Sahara dispute, it has been noted, will provide momentum for greater regional integration in North Africa, which would facilitate increased links between the Maghreb and the Sahel.

In fact, one could argue that had Mali followed Morocco’s lead and offered an autonomy plan as a serious basis of negotiations with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), the current crisis could have been avoided or at least reduced to a conflict over terms of settlement.

Two subsequent reports were published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (administered by both the Potomac Institute and the International Law Institute). In January 2010, a study on “Maghreb and Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threats from Al-Qaida and other Terrorists in North, West, and Central Africa” was published, followed a year later by a report on “The Consequences of Terrorism: Al-Qaida and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel and Maghreb.” These works presented overviews of terrorism during these years and dealt with the broad security challenges in their region and their strategic implications.

In light of the expanding violence triggered by the Arab Spring in the greater Middle East region, two additional reports were published. In January 2012, a study on “Terrorism in North, West, and Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring” focused on the events in 2011 and provided an analysis of the security status in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Chad; and in March 2012, a more comprehensive report on the “Arab Spring: A Year Later and Beyond” updated developments not only in the traditional Maghreb and Sahel, but also in fifteen additional countries ranging from Bahrain to Yemen.

In sum, the purpose of the “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications” is to focus on the security environment during the year, particularly in North, West, and Central Africa, with the hope that further research in this critical strategic region will be undertaken.

As in the past, a rigorous methodology regarding the collection of “terrorist incidents” has been used and is detailed in the beginning of the chronology.
Selected Recommendations

Since this report focuses on the national, regional, and global implications of the threats emanating from North, West, and Central Africa, these recommendations cover the same concerns and are intended for US policy makers as well as the international community. Bilateral programs may be helpful but are insufficient to meet the challenges in the region.

As noted, Mali presents the most immediate threat, particularly given the military efforts by France and others to block the infiltration by jihadists into the southern half of the country. This raises the threshold for violent recriminations by jihadists throughout the region and Europe. As the controversy at the United Nations over what can/will be done and who will participate illustrates, there are no “silver bullets.” Suffice it to say, these recommendations cover security, economic development, and political steps that need to be taken to bring greater stability to the region by reducing the presence and impact of terrorist and criminal groups and organizations. It is not fully inclusive but hopefully provides a useful framework for continued discussion and action.

1. Regarding Mali, the consensus that is emerging, given Algeria’s limited appetite for military intervention in support of French and possibly UN efforts, includes:
   a. Organizing international support for a responsible and respected government in Bamako and developing its military, security, and administrative capacities.
   b. Promoting negotiations with non-jihadist forces, particularly the Tuareg leadership (despite the unclear results of Algeria’s 2012 initiative in this regard), to achieve an agreement on autonomy for the region and its actual implementation.
   c. Building a capable regional military force to sustain the current military action and to ensure the stability and reintegration of northern Mali.
   d. Providing levels of international assistance over the longer term required to support reconciliation and reunification.

2. Invest in security by accelerating national and regional economic development through:
   a. Reducing barriers and providing incentives to foreign and domestic private investment.
   b. Undertaking structural reforms that promote economic growth, including: an independent judiciary, neutral regulatory regimes, transparency and fairness in the implementation of business regulations, reducing the role of government entities in the private sector, a minimum and equitable social safety net, educational reform linked to market needs, effective integration of women into the workforce, and decreased reliance on foreign assistance as a growth engine.
   c. Promoting regional trade and investment by expanding the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement provisions to broadly include products from North, West, and Central Africa.
   d. Streamlining and coordinating foreign assistance programs in the region by better integrating support from donor countries.
   e. Supporting the principles of the Deauville Partnership that link economic, social, and political development.
   f. Eliminating politically motivated trade barriers and other artificial restrictions on the movement of goods and services among the target countries.
g. Investing in national and regional workforce development programs that balance skills and leadership training objectives to encourage long-term capacity-building in labor markets within and across borders.

h. Expanding US foreign assistance programs through USAID and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and enabling projects such as Partners for a New Beginning (PNB) and the North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) to build platforms for developing young leaders in the public and private sectors.

3. Strengthen US intelligence assets in the region by broadening cooperation through AFRICOM and inter-agency linkages with all countries in the region to more effectively utilize equipment, training, and monitoring resources.

a. Continue to expand US counterterrorism technical assistance to internal security forces and police agencies.

b. Seek to more effectively coordinate security initiatives through greater intelligence sharing, particularly to interdict terrorist and criminal networks and supply lines.

c. Work to resolve the Western Sahara crisis and other regional political disputes that inhibit both security and economic cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel.

d. Reduce the flow of recruits to criminal and terrorist groups, and take a closer look at the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria with the purpose of developing long term solutions that would reduce the attraction of criminal and terrorist recruiting. Cooperate with regional and international agencies to eliminate humanitarian crises, particularly those that affect refugees in the Polisario camps and the border areas of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and the neighboring states.

As these recommendations highlight, a consistent and well-defined US security posture in the region is essential for developing effective security coordination among our friends there and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the core recommendations are the same as those in the 2011 report: “constructive and sustained engagement is vital, employing both ‘hard’ (security, military, intelligence cooperation) and ‘soft’ elements (economic and social development creating employment opportunities, education that equips students/trainees for jobs, and reduction of religious radicalism). Otherwise, the US, the EU, and our friends in the region will remain hostages to, and targets of the ideological, theological, and political terrorists for the remainder of the 21st century.” Lessons learned in hindsight can be very costly, and the Mali conflict may portend even more severe security disruptions in the region and beyond.

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Regional & National Assessments

The Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—as well as adjacent parts of the Sahel—Chad, Mali, and Niger—and for the past several years also Nigeria, have emerged as some of the most worrying strategic challenges to the international community.

Consider, for instance, the data generated since September 11, 2001. The attacks in the region perpetrated by AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other extremist groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia, MUJAO, and Polisario militants increased by more than 500 percent, reaching a high point in 2009 and remaining at dangerous levels despite modest declines in two of the last three years.

However, this escalating security challenge should be measured not only on the basis of the numbers of attacks, but must also be assessed by the grave tactical and strategic impact on the concerned countries, across a broad geopolitical “Arc of Instability” covering, to a larger or smaller extent, states in North, Central, and West Africa and beyond.

Undoubtedly the emerging vulnerable “underbelly” of the vast territories ultimately threatens the security interests of the greater Middle East as well as the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. More specifically, this evolving and worrisome strategic map is nourished by Al-Qaeda’s radical theology of jihad seeking local, regional, and global objectives and sustained by loose and at times more structured networks, based on organizational and operational collaboration.

The latest sober minded reminder of this “Grand Design” was communicated by a spokesman of an Australian branch of the extremist movement Hizb-ut-Tahrir, in a comment posted on the Internet on December 24, 2012: “...the duty of the caliphate-[is] to implement Islam internally and carry the light of Islam to the rest of the world. How? Not with flowers. It was the army of the Muslims, which started from Al-Madina, and they went to China, India, and Al-Maghreb. That is Jihad.”

The most significant strategic phase in advancing the foregoing vision in 2012 is the disturbing and evolving reality that AQIM and its affiliates have already carved out in northern Mali a new brand of “Afghanistan in the Sahara” by providing a safe-haven and establishing a breeding ground for jihadists in Africa, intensifying operations from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Thus, the terrorist challenge assumes even greater regional and inter-regional implications.

The following overview presents brief assessments of Mali, Algeria, and Nigeria (countries constituting major strategic concerns), followed by other regional states: Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger.
Mali

In the exposed Sahel, a new failed state the size of Texas, with ominous strategic implications, has emerged in Mali.

The current strategic threat was created initially in early 2012 when the secular Tuareg rebels, who fought alongside Gaddafi in Libya, returned home and joined indigenous forces to establish the MNLA. Exploiting a March political coup in the capital of Bamako and capturing important towns in the north, including the historic city of Timbuktu, the Tuareg fighters, together with Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Ansar Dine, declared their independent Azawan State. This development sparked security concerns and outrage from neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Niger, and international bodies including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the United Nations.

Two specific threats are particularly significant. First, there is a potential for the rebellion to spill over and galvanize Tuareg populations in neighboring countries to mount their own insurgency campaigns. Second, it is likely that terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaeda’s vision and supported by regional affiliates will expand their operations across Africa and beyond. These dangers have become even more alarming in view of the fact that by summer 2012, northern Mali had fallen under the control of various Salafi jihadist organizations including AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida’s El Moulethemine Brigade, and most recently the Libyan extremists of Ansar al-Sharia. It has been reported that AQIM has provided training, financial assistance, and weapons to its affiliates and has attracted an influx of recruits from the region as well as from Western countries.

In the short term, terrorism “from above,” that is, harshly applying Sharia law in the jihadist-controlled north, was expanding prior to the French intervention. Civilians have been publicly punished for their “crimes,” such as smoking or playing music. Also, thieves’ hands and feet have been amputated and extrajudicial executions have been undertaken. By early 2013, seven of Timbuktu’s 16 ancient cultural mausoleums had been smashed and destroyed, following the Taliban tradition in Afghanistan.

The full extent of violence and acts of terrorism being committed against the people of northern Mali is difficult to ascertain, as accurate reporting from inside the country since last spring has been an extremely hazardous undertaking. This may account for the relatively small increase in reliably reported terrorist incidents in Mali in 2012. It may also represent a temporary lull before the storm, as Al-Qaida-linked extremists focus on consolidating their position in northern Mali before exporting violence to neighboring countries or, as we have seen, attempted to take over all of Mali.

Certainly, the political, social, and economic dislocations in Mali have already resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis, including some 200,000 displaced people and 150,000 refugees, most of whom have moved to Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and other African countries.
In the face of these “wake-up calls,” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in collaboration with the United States, Europe, the African Union, and other like-minded parties, unanimously approved on December 20, 2012 a resolution aiming to restore Mali’s territorial integrity by confronting terrorism and disrupting criminal networks in the region. The resolution authorized the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), consisting of a 3,300-strong force, to be deployed by fall 2013. In light of this global strategy, AQIM has already accused France, a key mission partner, of endangering the lives of six of its citizens who were kidnapped separately in Niger (2010) and in Mali (2011), rather than negotiating for their release. Additionally, MUJAO abducted a seventh French national in Mali; and in Nigeria, the terrorist offshoot Ansaru kidnapped an eighth Frenchman.

As this report goes to press, the security situation in Mali is deteriorating even further. In January 2013 Islamic forces advanced southward from their northern base and captured the key strategic city of Konna, dealing a major setback to the central government. Mali’s interim president, Dioncounda Traore therefore declared a state of emergency and appealed to France for military support. An Ansar Dine spokesman immediately condemned the request and declared: “...while Dioncounda asked for help from France, we ask for guidance from Allah and from other Muslims in our sub-region because this war has become a war against the crusader,” according to a UPI report (January 11, 2013).

In light of this development, President François Hollande of France gravely warned that the “[terrorists] are seeking to deal a fatal blow to the very existence of Mali. France, as is the case with the African partners and all the international community cannot accept this.” As the former colonial power in Mali, and concerned over the safety of some 6,000 of its citizens in the country, France immediately intervened militarily, which included launching airstrikes against the jihadist forces occupying the north. The UN, the US, UK, Nigeria, and Senegal, among others, have also pledged their support, and some 400 European officers have arrived in the country to train the Malian army for a fall redeployment in the north. It should also be mentioned that ECOWAS authorized deployment of a force to defend the “territorial integrity” of Mali; additionally, a group within the MNLA, the secular Tuareg separatist group, offered to fight the Islamist rebels alongside the French and Malian forces. This offer was apparently motivated, at least partially by a fear of reprisals against Tuaregs for their role in the 2012 uprising.

In the interim, two major developments have unfolded on the ground. First, associates of AQIM launched the bloody attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria, reportedly in retaliation for Algeria allowing France to use its airspace for airstrikes in Mali. Second, French and Malian forces recaptured Diabaly (some 250 miles from Bamako), Gao (Northern Mali’s most populous city), and more significantly Timbuktu, the UNESCO world heritage site (where the Islamists forces destroyed several hundred ancient manuscripts before fleeing the city). French troops also took control of Kidal, the Islamists’ last urban stronghold in the North. As local Malians observed, however, extremist militants avoided a fight with the French and remain very much a presence in nearby villages, and in their desert and mountain hideouts.

By the end of January 2013, an international donor conference on Mali pledged over $450 million to help cover expenses of the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and to begin development projects in the country. Interim President Traore ruled out any negotiations with the Islamists, although he did indicate a willingness to hold talks with secular Tuareg rebels, and several Jihadists online messages warned France: “those capable of targeting the US, UK, and Spain can also target Paris (the Muslim Ummah has a thousand Merahs).”
During 2012, AQIM, which had its roots in the country’s civil war in the 1990s and formally linked-up with Al-Qaeda central in 2006, perpetrated some 125 attacks in Algeria directed against officials, police, the military, civilians, and foreigners, thus undermining the country’s political, social, and economic stability. For example, the governor of the Illizi region was kidnapped and brought to a hideout on the Algerian border with Libya. Similarly, three Spanish aid workers from a Polisario-run refugee camp in Algeria were abducted, reportedly with inside assistance from sympathizers in the camp. Organized criminals and regional terrorists have also been engaged in arms smuggling along Algeria’s borders with Tunisia and Mali. And in northwestern Mali, MUJAO operatives attacked the Algerian consulate and kidnapped the consul and six staff members.

Concerned with perpetual threats at home and potential confrontations with terrorists in Mali armed with Libyan smuggled weapons including surface-to-air missiles, Algeria is currently preparing for “guerrilla warfare” scenarios and is deploying troops along its vulnerable borders in the region. As recently as December 2012, Algeria formally agreed with Libya and Tunisia to implement much stricter common border controls. Two security concerns are noteworthy. First, Algeria arrested numerous terrorists last year on its southern border with Mali and Libya. Algeria asserted that as a consequence of the military operations undertaken in northern Mali, many militants and AQIM elements have escaped into their country and escalated violence locally. The other security concern is related to the efforts of the MUJAO to recruit unemployed youth from southern Algerian provinces in exchange for financial support for their poor families. Of particular concern are the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, which are rapidly becoming fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers in the region.

The most dramatic terrorist attack in Algeria in recent years began on January 16, 2013, at the gas field of Tengatourine in In Amenas, a region close to the Libyan border, located some 1,300 km from Algiers. The Islamic Katiba (militia), the “Al-Mouthalimin,” led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who split from AQIM in 2012 and consisting of some 32 assailants of different nationalities (e.g. Algerian, Tunisian, Malian, Nigerian, Egyptian, and Canadian), took over areas of the large facility operated by companies from Algeria, France, Japan, Norway, and the U.K. The terrorists, who reportedly trained for two months in Mali and were heavily armed, held some 700 Algerians and 134 foreign nationals hostage. The attackers demanded, inter alia, the withdrawal of French forces from Mali and offered to free US captives in exchange for the release of the Egyptian leader Omar Abdel-Rahman and Iraq’s top scientist Aafia Siddiqui.

Algeria ruled out negotiating with the terrorists and launched a military rescue mission on the day following the start of the siege. After some 50 hours of fierce fighting, Algeria announced that 685 Algerians and 101 foreigners had been freed by the operation but the death toll was costly – 11 Algerians and 37 foreign nationals (including three Americans, three Britons, and ten Japanese). Clearly, the strategic and tactical implications of the extraordinary international hostage crisis will be fully assessed by all concerned countries against the background of the unfolding security concerns in the region and beyond.
Nigeria

Nigeria is a critical geopolitical state in Africa and the continent’s most populous nation. In 2012 it became even more significant because of the rapid developments in the Mahgreb, Sahel, and elsewhere in connection with the Arab Spring, which impacted and escalated challenges from terrorists, criminals, and extremists.

As context, it must be recalled that years of instability in Nigeria have been characterized by a weak central government, severe poverty, internal conflicts surrounding shared oil revenues, and pervasive corruption. Religious intolerance and occasional violence between the twelve northern provinces, which are governed by some sort of Sharia Law and also the southern areas, mostly Christian and ruled by civil law, are also major contributing factors to political, social, and economic instability. In fact, it is estimated that over 10,000 people have died in factional clashes since democracy was re-established in Nigeria in 1999.

As it was indicated earlier in this report, the major active terrorist group in Nigeria with regional links is Boko Haram (meaning “Western Education is sacrilege” in the Hausa language). The movement seeks inter alia to impose strict Islamic law throughout the country. Traditionally, Boko Haram has targeted police stations, army bases, government installations, airports, financial and commercial bodies, and religious and educational institutions. The group came increasingly to international attention after it mounted a suicide attack on August 23, 2011 on the UN headquarters in the capital, Abuja, killing 23 and wounding more than 80 others.

Last year, this modus operandi was reported more frequently. For instance, on January 24, 2012, Boko Haram attacked eight security-related sites in Kano, the largest city in Nigeria’s Muslim North, killing over 185 people. Elsewhere in the country, the group stormed a prison and freed 200 inmates, many of whom were former militants; others kidnapped the mother of the Nigerian finance minister and several foreign workers, including French and South Korean nationals, in addition to killing Christian worshippers at Christmas Day church services.

These and numerous other acts of violence within the country prompted Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan to gravely warn that Boko Haram sympathizers had penetrated the government’s executive arm, parliament, and judiciary. Reports in 2012 also indicate that Boko Haram fighters have been involved in the Mali uprising and are also cooperating with AQIM and Al-Shaabab. Moreover, its members have received terrorist training abroad. This trend of moving from local issues into a wider network of violence both regionally, and ultimately even inter-regionally, fits the model of the internationalization of terrorist movements elsewhere, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and other indigenous Asian groups, including the Taliban.

It is against this troubling backdrop that the United States added Boko Haram to its terrorist list in an effort to target the organization’s upper command and its resources. And as recently as January 2013, France warned its nationals to leave Northern Nigeria due to threats from Al-Qaida associates over its intervention in Mali.
Two years after the “Jasmine Revolution” overthrew the autocratic regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and went on to inspire other countries to rise up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia is still vulnerable to both domestic and foreign terrorist threats.

Although the security situation in the country has been marked by the absence of the large-scale violence seen in Libya and Syria, the widespread dissatisfaction with social and economic opportunities is potentially explosive. For example, on July 26, 2012, protestors attacked provincial government headquarters in Sidi Bouzid, causing police to fire warning shots and tear gas at the crowd.

Moreover, since Tunisia shares an extensive border with Libya, it has been reported that some of the Libyan arms and militants who fought against Gaddafi’s regime have been imported to Tunisia to prepare for the next battle. The propaganda effort is already taking place.

Thus, since Tunisian Salafis declared via the internet on May 20, “Obama, we are all Osama,” it is not surprising that some members of the Uqba Ibn Nafi battalion, linked with AQIM, have already been arrested by security forces. The aim of this cross-national infrastructure is to recruit young Tunisians, indoctrinate them under the banner of jihad, and then send them to camps in Libya and Algeria for further military training in preparation for carrying out attacks in both Algeria and Tunisia.

Additionally, it is of particular concern that some Tunisian nationals are increasingly joining jihadist battles abroad. The latest example is a report posted on a militant Facebook page on October 1, 2012, stating that Abu Qasura al Tunisi, a Tunisian fighter who fought with Jabhat al-Nursa, had been killed in Syria’s civil war.

Finally, in the wake of the unfolding events in Mali and the Algerian hostage crisis, Tunisia and its neighbors agreed in January 2013 to new border patrol measures as part of a larger effort to stop arms smuggling and expanded activities by organized crime and terrorists. Moreover, Tunisia and Portugal signed an agreement to update their military cooperation.
In 2012, the new Libyan government began to consolidate power and introduced democratic reforms to the constitution. The transition has been difficult, and several powerful militias have risen in the power vacuum to contest the government’s influence.

There is also a serious security concern of retrieving sophisticated weapons, such as portable surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, which were looted from Gaddafi’s armories during the rebellion. These weapons pose a potential threat to the Sahel. As weapons proliferate throughout the region, terrorist networks could use them in major attacks as they are reported to have been used already in Mali.

There were numerous demonstrations of lawlessness and violence in Libya in 2012. For instance, on May 9 armed men attacked the Tripoli headquarters of Libya’s interim prime minister. Seven Iranian aid workers from the Red Crescent relief mission were abducted on August 1; and on the anniversary of 9/11, the American Ambassador and three State Department officials were brutally murdered by terrorists (Ahmed Boukhtala, the leading suspect in the Benghazi attack, still remains at large).

Internally, the country is afflicted by ideological religious, ethnic, and tribal fragmentation and violence. This makes Libya a fertile ground for AQIM and other extremists intent on continuing their recruitment and terrorist activities.

Externally, Libya is concerned by its vulnerable borders. Some of these areas were declared by the government “restricted military zones” and its forces carried out airstrikes against “suspected smugglers” near the borders with Chad and the Sudan.

By January 2013 two security issues were underscored. First, continued kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings in Libya marked the unstable atmosphere in the country’s political and economic development. And secondly, faced with concerns over the Mali crisis and the Algeria hostage incident, Libya vowed cooperation against extremism and terrorism with other Maghreb states and also offered to assist France militarily if requested. Additionally, Libya engaged in talks with the United Kingdom regarding possible security coordination and training.
Morocco

Unlike the escalating turmoil and violence that adversely affected the region in 2012, Morocco was notably a more secure country last year. Several reasons account for this development.

First, King Mohammed VI, the country’s hereditary monarch, is still seen as legitimate by the vast majority of the population.

Second, gradual political reform, greater economic and investment progress, increased employment opportunities, more social and civic equality for women, and some crackdowns on corruption have all contributed to improved internal stability.

And third, counterterrorism efforts at home and strategic cooperation and partnerships in the Maghreb, Sahel, and elsewhere have been strengthened.

Last December, for instance, an Al-Qaida cell that was allegedly recruiting young Moroccans to join the group in Algeria and other affiliates such as MUJAO in northern Mali was dismantled. In addition, members of Ansar al-Sharia, a new offshoot organization, were arrested on suspicion of plotting major attacks throughout Morocco.

Also, security services foiled a terrorist plan to establish a training camp in the Rif Mountains. In light of common threats to Morocco and Algeria, the two countries’ intelligence services have held joint, regular meetings on counterterrorism issues.

In the face of the expanding terrorist threats in the Maghreb and Sahel, Morocco in January 2013 made a strategic decision to strengthen cooperation with fellow African nations as well as the West.

It signed security agreements with France, Spain, and Portugal allowing access to Moroccan bases during the Mali crisis.

Furthermore, Rabat also continued its national multi-faceted campaign against extremism.
In 2012, Mauritania faced a number of security threats from terrorist groups linked to AQIM, the Polisario, and Boko Haram, as well as former fighters from the Libyan Revolution. These challenges were compounded by internal tensions between the country’s Arab and black populations, slavery and human trafficking, unemployment, and corruption.

Externally, the relationship between Mauritania and Senegal became strained over the use of water from the Senegal River, which serves as the border between the two countries, and thus is another source for conflict and violence.

Although the number of terrorist incidents, such as kidnapping, was lower in 2012 than in previous years, security issues were still on the government’s agenda. For example, in July, Mauritania’s cabinet considered monitoring the Internet to counter extremism.

Towards the year’s end the government substantially increased its defense budget to enable its security forces to attack AQIM and other militant groups. Mauritania’s president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz also called for the settlement of the Mali crisis in order to preserve its cultural heritage sites.

Also, it was reported by a Sharia media website on December 26, 2012 that Mauritanian authorities had arrested a British citizen en route to join terrorists in Timbuktu.

By January 2013, several security-related developments are noteworthy.

First, Tuareg MNLA separatists surrendered their arms in order to join other Malian refugees in Mauritania.

Second, threatened by rising AQIM threats, Mauritania and Senegal launched a joint campaign, based on both national security and educational considerations, aimed at combating terrorism along their shared border.

And third, Mauritania’s President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz asserted at the Arab Economic Summit in Riyadh on January 25, 2013 the importance of international cooperation to fight organized crime and terrorism.
Chad

Inspired by the Arab Spring, Chad in 2012 has made some progress towards building democratic institutions when it held its first ever municipal elections. Yet the country continues to be confronted by several security challenges. Eight hundred Malian mercenaries reportedly fighting with the Gaddafi forces during the revolution were deported back to their homeland.

A flow of illegal weapons has reached Chad through its 1,000-kilometer common border with Libya, and bloody clashes in the city of Kufra, near the borders of Chad and the Sudan, were ignited by tribal rivalry. AQIM also has continued with its recruitment and training activities in the Tibesti Mountains.

Finally, since Chad was affected by increased confrontations with neighboring countries, the president of Chad called for the creation of a regional force to fight terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. Also, despite not being a member of ECOWAS, by January 2013, Chad contributed troops to be engaged in the Malian action.

Niger

Niger still has an active AQIM franchise within its borders that has successfully attacked foreigners in the past. Due to this threat, international development organizations, specifically the Peace Corps have withdrawn from the country. There also remains an element of Tuareg insurgency in northern Niger that is suspected of having ties to AQIM.

It has been estimated that 150,000 displaced persons have fled Libya to Niger, including many Tuareg militants who fought for Colonel Gaddafi’s forces. Bilateral relations between Libya and Niger have suffered in the wake of the Libyan rebellion, as Niger has granted asylum to Saadi Gaddafi, one of Muammar Gaddafi’s sons. In late 2012, the EU sent counterterrorism experts to Niger to provide the country with assistance against terrorists, particularly AQIM, in the Sahel region.

Lately, it has been reported in the wake of the Algerian hostage crisis in January 2013 that the terrorists involved in the attack traveled through Niger and bought weapons in Libya. In the face of the situation in Mali, Niger granted the United States permission to establish local bases in the country for surveillance drones.
Conclusion

The brief foregoing security assessment of North, West, and Central Africa in 2012 reveals once again that there are generic contributing factors that feed radicalization and violence.

These include poor education; ethnic, racial, tribal, and religious intolerance; lingering poverty, unemployment, and inadequate basic services; pervasive corruption; political fragmentation and weak law enforcement capacities; vulnerable borders; organized criminal activities linked with militants; and home-grown as well as foreign imported ideological extremism.

Clearly, the security challenges, such as threat perceptions of each country analyzed in this study, differ according to their unique historical and contemporary experience. However, there also exists a number of regional concerns as reflected in the unfolding Arab Spring and in the intensification of the “Arc of Instability” from Mali to Somalia.

Indeed, the dangerous unfolding of strategic developments in Mali have resulted in bringing together the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to pledge to form a pan-Africa force (called International Support Mission for Mali, AFISMA) with Western nations, led by France that already has engaged in military operations against AQIM and their affiliates in the occupied territory in the north.

The United States and Britain have provided some logistical support. Additionally, the United Nations has been working in concert with African countries to implement its December 20, 2012 Security Council Resolution to confront the escalating terrorism in the region.

Despite these international efforts, the terrorist offensives are continuing and their propaganda messages promise that the worst is yet to come. Most recently, a MUJAO leader issued an ominous warning that “France has opened the gates of hell. It has fallen into a trap much more dangerous than Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.”

A stark glimpse of the future outlook was the latest hostage crisis in Algeria that underscored the need for a more effective international counterterrorism response in the coming months and years.

In sum, it is against this context of realities that both “hard” and “soft” power strategies must be developed by the international community as outlined previously in the “Selected Recommendations” segment of this study.

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3 The Washington Post, January 15, 2013
Data Table: Terrorism Incidents in Maghreb & Sahel since Sept. 11, 2001

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<td>31 attacks</td>
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<td>11</td>
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ANNUAL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN MAGHREB & SAHEL REGION
(Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, & Tunisia)

Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia

Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications

CHRONOLOGY: Incidents of Terrorism in the Maghreb & Sahel
**INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM IN MAGHREB & SAHEL:**

**Chronology from Sept. 11, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2012** (Updated with 2012 incidents below)

For full listing from 9/11/01 to 12/31/09, go to: [http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/524_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf](http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/524_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf)

For 1/1/10 to 12/31/10, go to: [http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/863_2010REPORT%20Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf](http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/863_2010REPORT%20Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf)


**Methodology** — Compilation of this comprehensive listing of Maghreb/Terrorism is based on monthly review of respected news and think tank websites, including international media and national press in Countries monitored—Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia. “Terrorist incidents” counted are those where a recognized terrorist group is reported or believed responsible, and results in death, injury, or kidnapping of civilians, government, or law enforcement officials, destruction of property, or threat to life and property where attacks are thwarted or bombs defused. Every incident includes the source cited.

All seven countries have suffered terrorist incidents during the 12 years tracked since Sept. 11, 2001. The 2012 Chronology below includes those countries experiencing incidents during the past calendar year — Algeria, Libya, Mali and Niger. See table on the preceding page and the hyperlinks above for incidents experienced by Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in other years.

Not included are acts of violence resulting from civil war or unrest not credibly attributed to terrorists (civil conflict in Libya, Tunisia), terrorist losses in gov’t counter-terror actions, or indigenous acts of religious extremism by ethnic and religious groups, including application of strict religious law (N. Mali). Lack of publicly available data likely results in undercounting in regions controlled by terrorists/extremists (N. Mali), and higher—though more accurate—relative counts where reporting is more widespread (Algeria).

### 2012

#### December 26, 2012

#### December 24, 2012

#### December 24, 2012

#### December 21, 2012

#### December 19, 2012

#### December 17, 2012

#### December 16, 2012

#### December 12, 2012

#### December 11, 2012

#### December 4, 2012

#### November 22, 2012

#### November 1, 2012

#### October 25, 2012
August 13, 2012
7 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Sidi Ali Bounah, Tadmait.

August 11, 2012
2 civilians wounded in a terrorist attack in Oglat Guessas, Tèbessa.

August 11, 2012
2 bombs explode on road between Béni Amrane and Bénit Khelifa, Boumerdès.
No one wounded in attack.

August 7, 2012
Businessman kidnapped by armed group in Mechtras, Bogni, Tizi Ouzou.

August 7, 2012
Local defense forces member wounded by terrorists in El Megueb, Ain Turk, Bouira.

August 3, 2012
3 border guards killed by terrorists in Rhar Boubane, Tlemcen.

July 31, 2012
Roadside bomb blast kills civilian and wounds 2 gendarmes near Jijel.

July 29, 2012
Soldier killed, 4 others wounded by bomb in Boumoussa, Tlidjen, Tèbessa.

July 27, 2012
4 soldiers in convoy wounded by terrorists in Issoumaten, Azzefoun, Tizi Ouzou.

July 25, 2012
Civilian driving to deliver bread to military barracks fired upon and killed by terrorists. In Drâ Taouil, Bordj Emir Abdelkader, Tissemsilt.

July 23, 2012
Terrorists attack military station in Passala, Ath Mansour, Bouira using mortars. No one wounded in the attack.

July 22, 2012
Homemade bomb explodes in Taghit, Chechar, Khenchela. No one wounded.

July 22, 2012
Civilian assassinated by an armed group in Oueld Ali, Ain El Hamra, Bordj Menaïel. Kidnapped by two armed men disguised as police officers and killed several hours later.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-citoyen-assassine-pres-de-boumerdes_21548.html

July 21, 2012
Policeman killed and his brother and father injured in a terrorist attack in Omar, Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.

July 16, 2012
Terrorists attack police station in Azzefoun with mortars. 3 police wounded.

July 12, 2012
4 gendarmes wounded in a bomb explosion in Bordj Menaïel on the road between Bizi Ouzou and Algiers.

July 11, 2012
Terrorists fire mortar shell at a gendarmerie barracks in Bouira. No one wounded in the attack.

July 9, 2012
Communal guard kidnapped by armed terrorists in Taghit, Chechar, Khenchela

July 7, 2012
2 police officers wounded in attack by terrorist group in Zemmouri, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/deux-policiers-blesses-dans-l-attaque-de-la-bmp-de-zemmouri_21390.html

July 4, 2012
Terrorists attack the ANP barracks in Tala Bounane, Tizi Ouzou. No one wounded in the attack.

July 4, 2012
2 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Babar, Khenchela.

July 3, 2012
Soldier shot and wounded by terrorists at a false roadblock in Ain Bessam, Bouira.

TIMELINE: Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel – 2012
TIMELINE: Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel – 2012
**March 23, 2012**
Communal guard killed, another wounded when armed individuals attack post in Elouza, Tarek Ibn Ziad, Ain Defla.


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**February 28, 2012**
Security forces defuse a bomb found by the roadside in Bordj Menaïl, Boumerdès.


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**February 5, 2012**
Soldier killed by bomb during sweep operation in Sidi Bnoun, Annaba.


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**February 4, 2012**
Civilian wounded in a bomb explosion in Oglat El Melha, Tébessa.


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**February 3, 2012**
2 gendarmes wounded in terrorist attack Ain Torki, Ain Defla.


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**January 29, 2012**
Bomb explodes on road between Baghilia & Dellys, Boumerdès. No one wounded.


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**January 29, 2012**
Soldier wounded in a roadside bomb explosion in Annaba.


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**January 27, 2012**
5 people killed and 1 wounded in a bomb explosion in Rass El Miad, Biskra.


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**January 25, 2012**
Terrorists wound policeman at urban security check posts in Zemmouri, Boumerdès.

http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-policier-blesse-dans-l-attaque-de-la-surete-urbaine-de-zemmouri-pres-de-boumerdes_19171.html

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**February 20, 2012**
Soldier killed, 12 others injured during a firefight in Beni Khelifa, Boumerdès.


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**February 4, 2012**
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**February 19, 2012**
Roadside bomb kills 4 bus passengers and injures 9 others. The bomb reportedly targets a military convoy, but goes off early and hits a civilian bus as it drives between Issers and Bordj Menail, Boumerdès.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**February 15, 2012**
Bomb targeting a gendarme convoy explodes on the road between Tidjilabine and Thénia, Boumerdès. No one wounded in the attack.


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**February 13, 2012**
Gendarme killed, 3 others wounded in clash near Tinzauatine, Tamanrasset, along the Algerian-Malian border. Fighting erupts when border guards try to intercept two all-terrain vehicles infiltrating Algeria from Mali. Assassins reportedly members of al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**February 11, 2012**
Algerian soldiers foil attack on border guards in Tinzauatine, Tamanrasset. 7 terrorists dressed as Malian soldiers killed in operation near Malian border. Algerian forces recover an all-terrain vehicle, nine different types of machine guns and 400kg of explosives.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**February 11, 2012**
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**March 20, 2012**
Security forces defuse bombs on road from Issers to Chabet-El-Amour, Boumerdès.


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**March 20, 2012**
Terrorists kidnap civilian in Mekla, Tizi Ouzou. Family receives ransom demand of 200,000 Euros for his safe return.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**March 17, 2012**
Terrorists kill a communal guard at a fake checkpoint on the road between Tizi Ouzou and Draâ El Mizan.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**March 8, 2012**
Soldier killed, another wounded by bomb in Djaoouan, Bordj Menaïl.


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**March 4, 2012**
Security forces investigating Tamanrasset bombing find 2nd vehicle with explosives. According to law officers, terror cell planned several attacks, forced to change plans after suspect arrest at Mali border.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**March 3, 2012**
Al-Qaeda group mounts suicide bombing of Tamanrasset gendarmerie headquarters, wounds 15 officers, 8 civilians. Movement for Unity & Jihad in West Africa, group that abducted 3 aid workers from Tindouf camps in October, claims responsibility.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**January 15, 2012**
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**January 10, 2012**
Two gendarmes wounded in an attack by suspected Islamists in Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**January 10, 2012**
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**January 5, 2012**
Terrorists kidnap a soldier in Mekla, Tizi Ouzou. Family receives ransom demand of 200,000 Euros for his safe return.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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**January 5, 2012**
Soldier wounded in roadside bomb attack in Annaba.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/article/566890/

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FROM 2012


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Articles and Reports:


Media Resources:


Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Yonah Alexander:

Professor Yonah Alexander serves as a Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and Director of its International Center for Terrorism Studies as well as a member of the Board of Regents. Concurrently, he is Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies. Both are consortia of universities and think tanks throughout the world. In addition, Professor Alexander directed the Terrorism Studies program (George Washington University) and the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism (State University of New York), totaling 35 years of service.

Educated at Columbia (Ph.D.), and Chicago (M.A.), he has held many academic appointments in the United States and abroad. Moreover, Professor Alexander lectured extensively in Europe (e.g. Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow, Oxford, Paris, Stockholm), the Middle East and Africa (e.g. Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Rabat), Asia (e.g. Astana, Beijing, Bishkek, Colombo, New Delhi, Seoul, Tokyo), and elsewhere in Latin America and the Pacific.

Professor Alexander is the founder and editor-in-chief of five international journals: Terrorism, Political Communication and Persuasion, Minority and Group Rights, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Review, and Terrorism Knowledge Base (Electronic). He has published over 100 books, including Al-Qaeda: Ten Years After 9/11 and Beyond (2012). His works have been translated into more than two dozen languages. Professor Alexander’s personal papers and collection on terrorism are housed at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University.

The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Background

Established in 1994 by GWU’s Terrorism Studies Program, the activities of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is affiliated with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries. It is jointly administered by the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute (Washington, DC), and the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (Arlington, VA).

Purpose

There exists the need to educate policy makers, and the public in general, on the nature and intensity of the terrorism threat in the twenty-first century. As a member of the academic and research community, the IUCTS has an intellectual obligation, as well as a moral and practical responsibility, to participate in the international effort to arrest the virus of terrorism. The purpose of IUCTS, therefore, is four-fold:

- To monitor current and future threats of terrorism;
- To develop response strategies on governmental and non-governmental levels;
- To effect continual communication with policy-makers, academic institutions, business, media, and civic organizations;
- To sponsor research programs on critical issues, particularly those relating enabling technologies with policy, and share the findings nationally and internationally.

INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES
Potomac Institute For Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203
E-mail: ICTS@potomacinstitute.org Tel. 703-525-0770
yalexander@potomacinstitute.org www.potomacinstitute.org