NATO’s Strategy: Continuity or Change?

January 2017
NATO’s Strategy: Continuity or Change?

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Introduction

Professor Yonah Alexander
Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies

Recorded history has repeatedly provided tactical and strategic lessons on the nature of political relations within, between, and among nations. Numerous universal postulates for the conduct of statecraft have been offered by philosophers, politicians, scholars, and other observers reflecting on the experiences of diverse societies regarding what does and does not work.

These collective insights focus on the perceived realities of national, regional, and global matters, including the role of history, the supremacy of self-interest, the cost of wars, and the benefits of peace. Other views deal with the nature of diplomacy in the struggle for power, and the value of multinational alliances in securing a stable world order based on the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the advancement of economic progress and prosperity.

As NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, celebrates its 68th anniversary, it still represents the most significant defensive alliance in the past two centuries. And yet, in early 2017, its 28 nation-state members are still facing a broad range of old and new horizontal and vertical challenges. These include piracy, terrorism, regional conflicts, humanitarian crises, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and cyber threats.

Indeed, besides the status quo and combined deterrence and containment of the 40-years’ Cold War, there are now the additional realities of the changed world from Europe to the Middle East and beyond. Suffice it to mention the ongoing Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, the escalation of radicalization and violence perpetrated by an array of state and sub-state actors such as al-Qa'ida affiliates, and the ominous continuing challenges of the newly declared caliphate of the “Islamic State” (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh). Indeed, amazingly enough, the only time NATO has been engaged in actual warfare was to assist its chief member, the United States, in the U.S. operations in Afghanistan—thousands of miles from the eastern edge of NATO territories bordering on the present-day Russia.

In the face of these and other multileveled threats, the key question arises as to whether NATO, at this stage of its evolution, is capable of completing its transformation from an earlier static defense alliance into a more effective regional and global security provider.

This question becomes even more critical at a time when the new United States administration has just assumed power on January 20, 2017. After all, during and following the election campaign, Donald J. Trump, both as candidate and subsequently as president-elect, has expressed inter alia skepticism of the European Union, declaring that it is bound for a breakup; that NATO’s current configuration is “obsolete;” and that he is unhappy with the security spending of other member states. He has even indicated that Russia’s annexations of the Crimea could be eased in exchange for a deal to reduce nuclear weapons.1
In this connection, it should be noted that NATO, during fall 2016 and early January 2017, has undertaken a number of diplomatic and military activities meant to underscore the regional and global strategic role of the alliance. For example, within Europe, NATO has reached out to several non-member states. The alliance and Georgia conducted military exercises in planning and executing crisis response operations; the alliance and Serbia held talks on security challenges facing the western Balkans, and coordinated defensive plans between them; and similar discussions have followed between NATO and Moldova on how to strengthen their bilateral relationship.

Likewise, the alliance also sought to expand its reach to nations beyond Europe. Thus, NATO and South Korea discussed how to deepen their cooperation, and shared their concern over North Korean challenges; NATO and Japan exchanged views on their security collaborative efforts, including the Asia-Pacific region; and the alliance and New Zealand held strategic talks including global terrorism threats.

Two additional recent NATO-related developments have significant strategic implications. On January 10, 2017, substantial American troops were deployed in Poland under NATO’s Operation Atlantic Resolve that was designed to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to counter perceived Russian threats in Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Denis Mercier of France remarked on January 17, 2017 that NATO has “...some structures that are obsolete” and therefore need to be changed, such as the approach to countering terrorism. On the following day Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Prime Minister, called for the creation of a European defense system “...with European means, with European investment, with a European projection capacity that will make the EU, the peoples and the nations that make it up, independent.” Echoing this message, President François Hollande of France asserted that “...Europe will always be willing to pursue transatlantic cooperation, but it will determine its path on the basis of its own interests and values.”

It is against this recent background that the uncertainties revolving around NATO’s future role during President Trump’s new administration are considered in this current report on “NATO’s Strategy: Continuity or Change?”

*Academic Approaches and Current Report*

Over several decades, numerous interdisciplinary briefs, seminars, workshops, and conferences focusing on NATO-related issues were held at universities and think tanks in the United States and abroad. Additionally, some NATO-designated institutions in Europe and elsewhere have provided academic frameworks for future research and other educational purposes. A case in point is the contribution of NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara that facilitated useful courses and workshops on different security concerns. The Partnership for Peace Training Center (PfPTC), also operating under NATO auspices in Ankara, has organized similar relevant activities. One noted event was the Silk Road 2010 Flag Officers seminar on “Towards a New Strategic Concept: The Future of NATO-Partners Relations,” held in Çanakkale, Turkey. Over 130 generals, admirals, other senior
officers, and ambassadors from some 40 countries participated at the gathering (selected papers presented at the seminar were published in Partnership for Peace Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 2010).

Consequent to the foregoing and other efforts, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) has organized in cooperation with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of State (Office of European Security, Political and Military Affairs-EUR/RPM) several academic undertakings during the past three years.


The third part, “NATO’s Assets and Capabilities,” incorporates two chapters that discuss “Capabilities Development and Common Funding” and “NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense.”

The final part, on “NATO: Quo Vadis?” totals six chapters and deals with topics such as “NATO-Russian Relations: Ukraine and Other Unfinished Business”; “The Changing Parameters of the Transatlantic Security Relationship: Case of Afghanistan”; “Partnership for Peace Consortium: An Innovative Approach to Defense Education and Institution Building”; “NATO Partnerships into the Future”; “NATO as a Security Exporter”; and “Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations.”

The second research undertaking produced a report on “NATO: Confronting Regional and Global Challenges” that was published in January 2016 by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the International Law Institute. This product highlighted the current challenges and future strategic responses of the Alliance in the aftermath of NATO’s Wales Summit held in the United Kingdom (September 4-5, 2014). In this report, Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen provided an overview of NATO observing that the Euro-Atlantic defensive and offensive alliance is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War. Other contributors included Raffi Gregorian analyzing the case study of the Balkans,
Patrick Murphy focusing on NATO and Russia relationships, and General (Ret.) Wesley Clark offering insights on NATO’s future.

The current report, “NATO Strategy: Continuity or Change?” is the third academic activity and is produced by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the International Law Institute, the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, and with the association of the U.S. Department of State. It is based on a seminar on “NATO: Post Warsaw Agenda” that was held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on October 31, 2016. This event followed the alliance’s 28th summit that was gathered in Warsaw, July 8-9 of that year.

It is noteworthy that the Warsaw Summit, according to its official documents, focused on a wide range of topics, including strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense, and projecting stability beyond NATO’s borders. Measures, such as the positioning of four multinational battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in 2017, and the development of a tailored forward presence in the southeastern part of NATO, were adopted; Initial Operational Capability of NATO’s ballistic missile defense was declared; a pledge was undertaken to strengthen national cyber defenses as cyberspace is recognized as a new operational domain like land, air, and maritime; support was promised to partners, especially in the fields of training and capacity-building; a decision was taken to use AWACS aircraft in service until 2035 and to use them to provide information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL; agreement was reached to change NATO’s counter-terrorism Operation Active Endeavour to a broader Maritime Security Operation; the parties also agreed to extend the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016 and funding for Afghan forces until 2020; a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine was endorsed; and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg signed a Joint Declaration with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission.12

Drawing from the Warsaw experience and its aftermath, the October 2016 seminar was afforded an opportunity to discuss a wide range of topics such as deterrence and defense issues, efforts to project stability, partnership and enlargement considerations, capacity building, additional operational activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and assisting the EU with its migration crisis.

The deliberations concerning these and related concerns have been incorporated in the current report. This publication’s opening presentations are by Richard Prosen (Office of European Security Political, and Military Affairs [EUR/RPM], U.S. Department of State); the Honorable Kenneth Wainstein (former Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush; first Assistant Attorney General for National Security, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chief of Staff to Director Robert S. Mueller III; currently panel member on the Blue Ribbon Study Panel for Biodefense); and Joseph Manso (Director of the Office of Regional Security, Political and Military Affairs in the Bureau of European and Eurasian affairs, U.S. Department of State).

Other contributors include Dr. Daniel Hamilton (former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization and Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two
secretaries of State; currently, Executive Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS); Jeffrey Rathke (former Director of the State Department Press Office and Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General in Brussels; currently, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies); and Dr. Jorge Benitez (Director, NATOSource; Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council).

During the event, other colleagues, including Ambassador (ret.) Kurt Volker (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; currently, Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership) and General (ret.) Alfred Gray (Twenty-Ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies) participated in the program and provided unique insights.

Finally, some acknowledgements are in order. Deep appreciation is due to Michael S. Swetnam (CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies); General (ret.) Alfred Gray; Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman, International Law Institute); Professor John Norton Moore (Director of the Center for National Security Law and the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law); and Professor Robert F. Turner (Distinguished Fellow and Associate Director, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law), for their inspiration and continuing support of our academic work in the field of global security concerns.

As always, Sharon Layani, Research Associate and Coordinator at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, deserves gratitude for her professional research and publication efforts, as do our team of interns during the fall 2016 and spring 2017 semesters, including Allison Davis (University of California, Davis), Cameron Dively (Carnegie Mellon University), Ryan Dunbar (University of California, Los Angeles), Jacob Fuller (University of Oklahoma), Connor Garvey (The Catholic University of America), Daniel Hennessy (University of California, Berkeley), Soomin Jung (State University of New York at Albany), Eunice Kim (State University of New York at Geneseo), Sheona Lalani (George Washington University), April Lee (George Washington University), Ghislain Lunven (Sciences Po, Paris), Cameron Niven (University of California, San Diego), Riley Plamp (University of Michigan), Isaac Shorser (American University), and Benton Waterous (American University).

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2 http://www.act.nato.int/nato-geo-ex-16-kicks-off
3 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_137794.htm
4 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_138326.htm
7 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139970.htm
10 Ibid.
11 This international journal was published by the Partnership for Peace Training Center under the auspices of NATO. Yonah Alexander, co-founder of the journal, served as Editor-in-Chief.
12 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm#
I am very pleased to be here today to help moderate today’s event. I want to also express my appreciation to our distinguished panel members and, of course, our host, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and offer my welcome to all those here today and those who will be watching this event broadcast over the Internet or on television. The goal of today’s event is simple, yet important. We are here today to take stock of where we are on NATO capabilities, operations, and policies, and provide suggestions on ways ahead for the near future. We are pleased that you could join us here today, and we look forward to a stimulating and thought-provoking discussion from our panel of experts.

NATO as an alliance acquires its potency not only from its military capabilities but also from its democratic ideals – from our belief in human dignity and our respect for human aspirations. In fact, the Washington Treaty, which founded NATO in 1949, emphatically states that our collective defense Alliance is also a community of values “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” We stand today at a pivotal moment for our Alliance. In the nearly 70 years of NATO, perhaps never have we faced such a range of challenges all at once – security, humanitarian, and political. NATO is as important and vital for our security as ever, especially as we face a more dangerous road ahead.

Terrorism affects us all, from Brussels to Nice, Paris, Orlando, and San Bernardino. We stand together in the fight against Da’esh. NATO is stepping up its efforts to support the coalition fighting Da’esh, including by contributing AWACS aircraft to improve our overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. NATO is also moving forward with enhanced information-sharing and other measures. And we have to remember that NATO’s biggest military operation ever – in Afghanistan – was a direct response to 9/11.

As President Obama and other leaders have noted, at Warsaw we did far more than simply reaffirm our Article 5 obligations to our common security. In Warsaw this past July, Allies agreed to the most significant reinforcement of our collective defense at any time since the Cold War. The bumper sticker headline from Warsaw was: An Essential Alliance in a More Dangerous World: Protecting our Citizens & Projecting Stability, which echoed remarks given recently by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at an event hosted by Harvard University in September 2016. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reminded us the Alliance is: “standing together as we have always done, stronger together as we have always been.”

In conclusion, then, with renewed strength, resources, and capabilities, NATO will continue to uphold our common values and meet the full range of our shared threats.

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1 The opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, or the United States government.
Honorable Kenneth Wainstein
Former Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush; first Assistant Attorney General for National Security, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chief of Staff to Director Robert S. Mueller III; currently panel member on the Blue Ribbon Study Panel for Biodefense

Let me just start off by sort of framing a term that was used twice when it was said that I am going to discuss the “broader context.” That is sort of code for I am going to talk about something beyond what we are talking about here today. So Yonah Alexander asked me about a month ago if I would join this panel. He said, “I have got this great panel of NATO experts and I would love you to join them.” I said, “That is great! I would love to join. Only problem is I am not a NATO expert.” He said, “That is fine. You will provide the ‘broader context’.”

So what you can tell from my biography is that I am sort of an old law enforcement/intel guy, and that is my background. And in the course of a number of those jobs, I spent a good bit of time working with our foreign partners over in Europe, some under NATO auspices and some otherwise. What I thought I would do in terms of the broader context is discuss NATO and counterterrorism, the challenges, the threat we are dealing with right now, and NATO and the extent to which it is or is not suited to address the current threat. So that is the angle I am going to take. And I am going to do that by drawing on my experiences since 9/11 as part of the law enforcement and intelligence community here in the U.S., trying to take the apparatus we had as of 9/11 -- the culture, the counterterrorism process we had at 9/11 -- and bring it up to speed so that we could prevent terrorism on our shores. Then I’ll draw analogies for what NATO has to do to do the same more broadly throughout the alliance.

If you look back at the history of NATO, as has been said by the panel here, it is a political and military alliance, yet the one time that the Article 5 collective defense provision was invoked was in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I think since that date we have seen an increasing focus on counterterrorism as part of the Alliance’s mandate, culminating in the counterterrorism guidelines that I think were issued back in 2012, and continuing interest and attention being paid to the terrorism threat since then. And that is attention and time well spent because it does not take much thinking to realize how the terrorism threat that NATO across the board is facing is increasing in seriousness, increasing in volume of threats, and increasing in terms of the complexity of the organizations and operations we are facing.

Just go through some of the factors that have come up in the last few years: the rise of ISIS or ISIL, which has obviously been a game-changer. They almost make al-Qa’ida look quaint in terms of their barbarity, their success, frankly, and the level of infrastructure and operational complexity they are capable of. You have got the flow of immigrants -- obviously since the Syria crisis -- into and throughout Europe. You have got fighters flowing down to join ISIS and fight the wars in Syria, and those same fighters returning -- hardened trained fighters coming back to their homeland, wherever they are throughout NATO, and wanting to carry the fight back to the homeland. You have got the homegrown terrorism phenomenon and how that has been, actually, accelerated and exacerbated by the ISIS narrative. You have the fact
that ISIS has a caliphate in its eyes and people feel like that is something they can grab onto, that they want to fight for, and I think we are seeing the impact that ISIS is having in terms of really energizing people to become homegrown terrorists throughout the West, including here in the United States. And you have the fact that with the al-Qaeda core -- in other words the traditional al-Qaeda that was established and really headquartered in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- with the diminution of its authority and the greater sort of franchising of al-Qaeda and then ISIS, which is an outgrowth of al-Qaeda in Iraq, you see more and more of these threats being franchised around the world. In many ways that is a more difficult challenge to deal with for all of us, including for NATO, than the traditional al-Qaeda threat like we had on 9/11. So, the long and short of it is, for all of these various reasons, the threat is real and it is only getting more and more serious.

So, what should NATO do about it? And this is where I go back to my initial remarks. There are a lot of things that need to be done to try to beat this threat and what I would like to do is see what kind of lessons we can draw from the experience that the United States went through after 9/11 and that I was a part of.

Just to take a minute to go back and remember the history since 9/11 and what we dealt with here in the U.S. You know, we woke up on the morning of September 12th with around 3,000 people dead and with a clear recognition that we had a counterterrorism system or process that was just not up to the task. It was not capable of preventing that kind of attack again in the future. So, you know, we had to get busy and get to work.

But the challenges were myriad; you had law enforcement and intelligence operations and personnel that were not coordinated. In fact, there was a variety of ways in which they were prevented by law and by regulations from coordinating their operations, even though law enforcement officials were going after foreign terrorists as a criminal threat and intelligence officials were going after the same terrorists as an intelligence objective. They were unable and oftentimes unwilling to coordinate and share information. You had the FBI itself not coordinated internally. You had agents who were focused on intelligence operations and agents who were focused on criminal investigations, and often they did not share information and were sometimes prevented from sharing information. You had federal law enforcement that was not coordinated with local law enforcement -- the eyes and the ears, the 700,000 odd officers in the street who are really the ones who are going to detect a terrorist cell in the first place. While there were joint terrorism task forces, the mechanisms for coordination between the federal and the state and local levels were really not sufficient at all. And then you also missing, just on a general intelligence level, coordination and sharing of information among all of the federal actors, much less the federal, state, local, and tribal actors. And so this was the situation that we confronted as of September 11th 2001.

Just to make it clear, this was not the fault of any one administration. It was not that anyone necessarily was terribly shortsighted. Rather, it was a lack of appreciation by the whole country of the severity of the threat. I think we were sort of living off of the post-Cold War peace dividend and did not want to, in some ways, acknowledge the threat that we were seeing with the bombing of the Cole and then the bombing of the embassies. We saw it, but we almost did not want to believe that it was
coming our way and it was going to be as serious as it was, as it became manifest on September 11th.

We needed the political will to make those changes, and we got it. It took the clarion call of 9/11 to do it, but we got it and numerous changes have been made since then. I will tick off a few of them. You have the CIA and the intelligence community, who are generally working with the FBI on a much more regular basis. Joint briefings and information sharing happened almost on day one after 9/11 in a way they have never happened before. You have the National Counterterrorism Center, which is designed to draw together terrorism information from all around the country, all around the federal government. You have the FBI becoming much more of an intelligence-driven agency, not just a law enforcement entity. And you have the federal agencies and the state and local agencies working very closely together with fusion centers, joint terrorism task forces, and the newly created DHS (Department of Homeland Security) working very closely with state and locals. And there even are the sort of mundane things, like more police officers who are receiving clearances so that they can actually get access to terrorism information and intelligence they need to keep their communities safe.

So, you have all of those changes that have been going on since 9/11 here in the United States, and the result is a lot of improvement, but it is still a work in progress. And I say that because, as I look at NATO and our alliance more broadly, we are facing the exact same challenges that the U.S. individually faced on day one. And the challenges really are to develop the coordination that is necessary to prevent terrorism before it happens, not just to go back and investigate it after it happens but to prevent it from happening -- whether that is under the official auspices of NATO, or just via cooperation and coordination among all the member states. So, all of those same challenges are there but, actually, there are even more.

This is the sobering part of my remarks, which is that when we were trying to develop more coordination here in the U.S., we were dealing with one country, one same general set of rules. But when we are dealing with 28 different countries, it is just a different ballgame.

I saw this in my interactions with my foreign partners. At a completely fundamental level, even at a definitional level, different countries see terrorism as a different type of problem. I remember in 2006 or 2007, at a meeting with a number of our foreign partners, we working very closely together, making a lot of operational headway against various terrorism threats, but we were talking about the Military Commissions Act, which had just been passed which set up the military commissions by law or by statute. And it was fascinating because our foreign partners were very upset about that statute. Their point was – these were Western European partners – this is not a war; this is a law-enforcement action, this is not a war. We have seen war on our shores, we have seen what war is and this is not a war. And they saw what we were dealing with after 9/11 as more akin to the Red Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof Gang of the 1970s and less a war. Whereas in the United States, we had done what we often do here. We saw a real problem, in this case one could argue an existential problem, called it a war, and went after it, mobilized our country and went after it. So just that definitional issue, at a very foundational level, causes problems of coordination.
Another challenge is the very different legal systems that we are dealing with among the different countries. Another anecdote: I remember talking to our partners about our effort -- the United States’s effort -- to try to get passenger name record information, the names of people who were on airplanes, manifests information. We wanted this information for obvious reasons, because we were attacked by airplanes on 9/11. And in the American legal culture, third party records, or records that are held by a third party like this kind of information, do not get that much legal protection. That is just sort of the way our culture has developed and that is the Constitutional doctrine. But in Europe, they are very protective of that kind of information. So here we are asking for something that we thought was almost a gimme, and they were saying, “No, that is something we can not give.” In the same meeting, after having that conversation, we started talking about jihadist websites and how we are dealing with that problem, how to deal with these extremist websites that might not actually be going over the line to affirmatively encourage violence. We were trying to figure out what to do in keeping with our strong principles of First Amendment rights. And a couple of the folks we were dealing with just said, “Oh, we just take them down.” To us that was unbelievable because we have such a strong First Amendment. They just see it differently. So, neither side is right or wrong, but the concern is that when you are dealing with a security effort like this that requires law enforcement and touches on individual liberties, it is a real problem to try to coordinate efforts among different countries with different legal expectations.

And those different expectations also extend to different expectations about classified information, and how to share classified information among different countries. Here in the U.S. we have one classification system established by the federal government and then we share among people we feel are entitled to get that information. Every country has its own system.

So, in other words, we have got a number of different challenges for NATO to try to move to the next level in terms of coordination. And coordination is the touchstone of prevention. You can not prevent an attack, a terrorist incident, unless you coordinate the intelligence collection, targeting, and dissemination, and the operations based on that intelligence.

To wind this up and get past the more sobering part of it, I applaud the fact that there is a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence. I think that is a step forward. It will be interesting to see how that position ends up, being defined in practice. I understand that it initially was established with the idea that it would focus on Russian military capabilities, but obviously a big part of that person’s mandate is going to be to deal with terrorism threats, in particular the ISIS threat. And that person’s job is going to be to try to do something roughly comparable to what we have been trying to do here in the United States for 15 years. And it is a job much more difficult by the peculiar challenges of trying to do this across an alliance, and trying to get different players to work together despite all these various logistical, practical, and legal obstacles. And it is my hope that the member states of the alliance and the public have the will to do that, because there are a lot of tough decisions to be made. But given the threat that we have right now, it is a job that has got to be done.
Today’s topic is “NATO: Post Warsaw Agenda” and to put this in a little context, I would like to spend a brief moment on what happened just before Warsaw and what happened after Warsaw. So, before Warsaw we had the Wales Summit that had significant accomplishments in three areas. The first area was the strengthening of NATO itself in terms of the tools available to the alliance and the creation of two new programs. One for enhanced opportunity partners, which brought a number of nations much closer to the alliance – Finland, Sweden, Georgia, Australia and Jordan. Each one brought unique capabilities and regional insights, and these nations are now working with NATO in a very close way. It also led to the creation of something called Defense Capacity Building Missions, the thought here being that part of the security toolkit as we look forward is going to be training countries around the world in terms of building their military and security capabilities.

So these two things were created at the Wales Summit. In addition, of course, Wales came after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the immediate reaction of the allies, which was quite firm, was upheld at Wales. Part of this was the creation of the Readiness Action Plan and the deployment of allied forces on a rotational basis in certain parts of Eastern Europe, and also the suspension of the day-to-day activities of the NATO-Russia Council, keeping, however, open the possibility of political level consultations at the level of ambassadors.

And the third area of work which occurred at Wales, largely on the margins of the summit but did occur there, was the creation of the Counter-ISIL Coalition. So it was a very intense 48-hour period of activity at Wales where a lot got done.

This sets the stage for the Warsaw Summit. Now in Warsaw again, I would divide the work of the summit into three baskets, starting with the work that was done in the east as we move from reassurance to deterrence, and a large part of this is the enhanced forward presence, the deployment of four battalions in four Eastern European countries, the three Baltics and Poland. The U.S., Germany, Canada, and the UK are taking the lead for these battalions, but a number of other allies are also contributing forces.

In addition, we had just before the summit an exercise that certified the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force as part of NATO’s rapid reaction capabilities, and we also had an agreement on a tailored presence in Southeastern Europe. So this was part of the package of moving from reassurance to deterrence. There was also a package of measures regarding the south; NATO would continue its Aegean activity. NATO was prepared to offer support to the Counter-ISIL Coalition, in particular in the areas of AWACS flights and defense capacity building. NATO also offered its support to the EU and in particular Operation Sophia in the Central Med. So this was a package of issues related to security challenges coming from the south.

And the third basket of issues I would look at in terms of both new challenges and an increasing focus on more effective NATO-EU cooperation. NATO and the EU issued a joint declaration: they were going to work on a number of areas more closely
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together. This includes hybrid, it includes cyber, and this is something that we are following very carefully. If we look at the recent Defense Ministers Meeting at the end of October 2016, we see that progress has been made on all these fronts, that indeed the nations that are the framework nations for enhanced forward presence will in the first half of next year be deploying the battalions as agreed into Eastern Europe. These are on a rotational basis. Operation Sophia in the EU has requested NATO support, and NATO has agreed to provide both information sharing and situational awareness as well as logistical support to Sophia. They have also agreed to continue the Aegean activity, and of course NATO is working on furthering its cooperation with the EU, and I would expect that at Foreign Ministers in December 2016 we will see a more detailed report on where we are on implementation of our cooperation with the EU.

Wales and Warsaw, I think together, represent a very significant development in terms of NATO’s actual capabilities and the focus of the alliance. NATO has always been a political-military alliance. Allies can come to discuss any security issue that is of concern to them at NATO. NATO has always been able to adapt and has adapted to a new security environment through these two summits.

So finally as we look forward, the Brussels Summit has been agreed for next year. It is a little bit difficult for me to go into a lot of detail on the Brussels Summit for a couple of reasons. One is in fact that allies have not yet agreed formally on an agenda for the Brussels Summit, but also because, as some of you may have heard, we have an election in the United States in the next week and I cannot commit the new administration. What I would say is that it is very likely that allies in Brussels will take a look at the decisions that were made at Warsaw and will take stock of the implementation of those decisions, which do seem to be on track and will be an important part of the Brussels Summit.

I will conclude on a note that I have spent 11 years on and off working on NATO issues, and when you have something like the Consensus Rule where 28 allies have to agree before you do something, it sometimes can seem a bit like herding cats. But I must say that I was very impressed by the mood of the allies at these summits, by the prompt and firm action that they took, by the level of unity and the spirit of unity both in terms of reassurance and deterrence and in terms of the need to take action regarding new challenges in the south. I was also struck by the empathy that allies demonstrated for each other’s security concerns, where eastern allies understood that there were different but real security concerns in the south and southern allies understood that there were different but real security concerns in the east. So I would say that NATO, while not a perfect alliance, is a healthy alliance and we can look forward to the next year with some degree of confidence.

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1 The opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, or the United States government.
When one considers how NATO is likely to evolve in future, it is useful to look at decisions taken at its past two summits in Wales and Warsaw, and to look ahead to a Brussels Summit in 2017. Since achieving consensus among 28 allies can be strenuous, NATO needs the focus of a summit to force allies to agree on major new evolutions in Alliance approaches. That is one reason why NATO’s agenda tends to be advanced through these summits.

Going into the Wales and Warsaw summits, the Alliance had been grappling with two internal tensions. The first was the “in” or “out” tension. For over two decades NATO’s mantra has been “out of area or out of business.” Following the end of the Cold War, it was time to enlarge the Alliance and to project stability to regions beyond the Alliance, including the campaign in Afghanistan. Yet, at the same time it has become clear that the Alliance also faces challenges to its own populations, territories, and vital functions of its societies. The front line used to be the Fulda Gap; we worried about traditional armies. Today the front line could be the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul. It could be the Frankfurt Airport. It could be the Washington Metro. So I and others have been arguing for some time that NATO’s new mantra must be “in area or in trouble.” The Warsaw Summit was able to bring these two themes together by agreeing on a set of issues to address both “out of area” threats as well as “in area” challenges. The Alliance does not have the luxury of choosing one over the other, it must do both.

The second internal tension facing the Alliance was between those allies, particularly in the south, which argued that the greatest security challenge facing NATO nations was the host of issues spewing from conflict across the broader Middle East, and those allies, particularly in the east, who argued that the greater security threat was in the east in the form of Russian aggression and instabilities across a growing grey zone of non-NATO Eastern Europe. Here again the Alliance bridged these differences at Warsaw by declaring that NATO must adopt a 360-degree view of the panoply of challenges it faces, and that Alliance solidarity demands that eastern Allies contribute to addressing southern threats and that southern allies contribute to dealing with eastern threats. I would add that not only are both threats highly important, they are also tending to come together in ways that could generate even greater security challenges to the Alliance. The intrusion of Russian state power into Syria, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea adds new dimensions to ongoing struggles across the Alliance’s southern periphery. And displaced persons, super-empowered groups, and hybrid warfare have spread across Europe’s east in ways that can confound traditional Alliance approaches to security.

In the meantime, however, we are also discovering a third internal tension, and that is inside the West itself. There has been a lot of verbiage during the U.S. presidential campaign about the value or lack of value of NATO. Many European allies are wondering where the United States really stands and whether its commitment to European security remains as solid as in the past. There is concern that the U.S. has been distancing itself from NATO, driven by the perception that Europe was, in good
Yankee jargon, “fixed,” and that the United States needed to address other priorities elsewhere in the world.

Frankly, Americans have been having the same concerns about Europe’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership. Brexit has stolen the headlines, but Europe is also facing many challenges simultaneously, including migration flows, sluggish economies, continued crises in various eurozone countries, populist pressures squeezing the political center, and Russian activities challenging the European project. I am saddened to say this, but I believe that over the next period of time Europe is going to be much more fluid, much more uncertain, much less capable, much less credible. And the continued engagement of the United States is likely to be critical to help our European allies maneuver through their current predicaments. Rooted in this must be an understanding that the United States is not just a power in Europe, it is a European power as such, and one that is critical to the coalitions and compromises that comprise modern Europe.

In short, Europeans and Americans each point to the other side of the Atlantic and shake their heads about how bad things are across the ocean, without stopping to reflect that their allies are saying the same thing about them. We must get beyond this mutual finger-pointing and Schadenfreude, and act as if we have an Alliance that matters.

Coming now to the first 100 days of a new U.S. Administration and the next NATO summit agenda, the most important priority will be a strong mutual affirmation that we stand together as allies, that we agree broadly on the nature of the threats we face, and that we will address them together. We must affirm the credibility not just of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also Article 4, Article 3 and all the other articles. The next U.S. president should make this a clear and immediate priority. The next NATO summit should take place as soon as possible in 2017 to project this political message of mutual solidarity and support, rather than a business-as-usual summit that could fall victim to lower-level issues and bureaucratic process.

This strong and broad mutual affirmation will help NATO move forward with the Alliance’s next agenda. There are various priorities. I will highlight three.

The first priority for NATO going forward is in the traditional realm of defense and deterrence. At Wales and then at Warsaw the Alliance has moved to a position of 360-degree defense and deterrence, and is now establishing a much stronger forward presence on the territories of eastern allies. The challenge now, however, is to strengthen the Alliance’s capacity to scale up and deploy follow-on-forces to those regions of the Alliance in a situation in which defense and deterrence could come under siege. European conventional forces are no longer in a position to fill this role robustly. This is a high priority for NATO going forward.

The second two priorities are in less traditional realms, and here the priority question to be addressed is not what NATO should do, but where it fits. In traditional areas of defense NATO is more often than not our lead institution. But in less conventional areas, NATO should not necessarily take the lead. It can be important in some areas, it can offer effective support in other areas, but in still other areas it could be useless or irrelevant to the challenge at hand. We must tease out priority areas
where NATO should take the lead, where it can be a supportive actor, and where it can be a part of the ensemble of institutions that deals with the challenges.

The question where NATO fits is relevant to the second priority for the Alliance going forward, and that is to promote resilience. I was gratified to see that the Warsaw Summit lifted the theme of resilience as an Alliance priority and set forth seven baseline requirements that each ally should be able to meet under Article 3, which can be considered the “self-help clause” of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is practical work, and should be applauded. But it should be understood only as a first step toward a more effective and comprehensive resilience agenda. Country-by-country approaches to resilience -- and that is essentially what the Alliance set forth at Warsaw -- are important, but insufficient. Resilience must be shared, and it must be projected forward.

Resilience begins at home, of course, and is foremost a task for national governments. Yet in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats, and disruptive hybrid attacks, no nation is home alone. Few critical infrastructures that sustain the societal functions of an individual country are limited today to the national borders of that country. This means that traditional notions of territorial security must be supplemented with actions to address flow security -- protecting critical links that bind societies to one another. Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must also focus on protecting their connectedness. This requires greater attention to shared resilience. None of the seven baseline requirements for resilience established within NATO in advance of the Warsaw Summit can be met without attention to shared resilience.

NATO and EU members also share a keen interest in projecting resilience forward, since robust efforts by one country may mean little if its neighbor’s systems are weak. NATO allies and EU member states have a vested interest in sharing approaches and projecting operational resilience procedures forward to key neighbors.

Effective resilience should encompass a spectrum that embraces national, shared and forward strategies, and which itself is an integral part of broader “full spectrum” efforts at deterrence and defense.

Forward resilience is a new type of project for the Alliance, but not only for the Alliance, and here we return to the question of where and how NATO fits. Much of the resilience agenda is civilian in nature. The EU also often plays more of a role here than NATO. NATO-EU cooperation will be important. Individual countries can also lend support. For instance, Sweden and Finland each have strong traditions of societal security and total defense, from which NATO allies and EU member states alike could profit. Resilience offers another plank in the web of ties that we are extending between NATO and these two important value-added partners.

The third priority is sorting out how the Alliance fits with regard to the entire basket of challenges and threats to NATO’s south. Some argue that NATO needs a southern “strategy.” Others say there is not a single southern issue but a conglomeration of issues -- and many of them are neither military nor necessary amenable to solution by civil-military tools. NATO will need to find its place in the
array of institutions and initiatives the West and its partners are likely to deploy to deal with this vast range of challenges.

The creation of the counter-ISIL coalition illustrates the difficulty of finding a role for NATO. Even though the coalition was formed on the margins of a NATO Summit, NATO is actually not part of the coalition. Many southern European allies are very reluctant to get into new commitments in their neighborhood through NATO. Many Arab states are reluctant to see NATO *qua* NATO engaged. And if we are honest, the U.S. government also does not know whether NATO *qua* NATO should be engaged. CENTCOM is reluctant to bring NATO in, while sort EUCOM argues that NATO has capabilities to offer. And since the U.S. has not been clear about its own stake in this issue, that only feeds into the uncertainty about NATO’s role.

In conclusion, we need to think harder about where NATO fits in the south. Of course, NATO is already active across the region, but its efforts are eclectic and not held together by any unifying thread. Going forward I would suggest that Alliance members must make it clear that they have the political will to act together in the south, that they are able to forge new cooperative mechanisms with the EU, focusing in particular on best division of labor, that the Alliance will engage in the closest political consultation with such southern partners as the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and that NATO should step up its game in such areas as countering WMD, maritime patrols, migration control, counter-terrorism, and building partner capacity.\(^2\)
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We have heard a bit about NATO’s military adaptation since the Russian aggression in Ukraine and some of the military and security issues that will test the next U.S. administration. I agree with the points that have been developed so far. Personally, on that score, my view is that after a lot of very necessary and effective work by NATO, primarily in dealing with the conventional military posture on the land in central and eastern Europe, the most pressing need from a military perspective is for NATO to address its air and maritime posture and its capabilities in the Baltic Sea region and the Black Sea region and in the eastern Mediterranean.

But, if I could take a step back and look at this from a slightly different angle, if we are thinking about the top one or two priorities for an incoming administration—that is, the things the United States government has to get right in order to advance our interests in Europe and to advance our common interests with Europe in the Euro-Atlantic region and around the world—I think the top priority is a political one, and that is to address the U.S. interests that are affected by a fragmenting Europe, a Europe that is increasingly divided among competing visions, sometimes of individual member states and sometimes within member states.

Perhaps it should go without saying but the United States relies on Europe. It is not only our biggest economic and trade relationship, our most interconnected defense relationship through NATO, our intelligence sharing, our political cooperation—if you take almost any area of government activity, we work closely, and often most closely, with our European friends and allies. But now we are in a situation where European unity is under pressure from several different directions. And unless you are an advocate of American unilateralism, which generally does not work out particularly well for the United States, we need to find a way to recognize and to address the way that affects our interests.

Now the European reaction to the centrifugal tendencies has also not been monolithic. You have on the one hand Brexit and on the other you have the European Union producing a global strategy, which is a good document that outlines a number of areas where the European Union plays an important role and can play an even more important role in the future. So you have both tendencies. Which of these will win out, and what Europe is going to look like in several years after these various tendencies have resolved themselves is anybody’s guess. But it certainly affects the U.S.’s ability to relate to Europe, to cooperate with Europe not just militarily but politically and economically as well.

So we need to be actively engaged, especially if you think about the possible consequences of a so called “hard Brexit,” an abrupt severing of the UK relationship with the European Union, and/or an acrimonious negotiation between the UK and the remaining European Union countries about the terms of that exit. So I think that what this means is that there needs to be an intensified U.S. investment not just in our partnership with the European Union and our partnership with the UK, but also an engagement on, in certain instances, the specific issues that will develop, that will
arise, between the UK and the EU, so that we minimize the risks to our shared prosperity as well as our ability to act in a coordinated fashion and an effective fashion around the world. So that is a bit about the internal challenges.

The external challenges: the Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and the United States, face the problem of external malignant influence. I would point anyone who has not read it to at least the opening parts of the Warsaw Summit communique – the thing is actually pretty long – but Joe Manso, if you had a hand in any of the language that appeared in it, I would give you great credit for it because for those of you who deal with these kinds of consensus documents, they often wind up reading like consensus documents. But if you look at the opening paragraphs of the Warsaw communique, which talks about Russia’s actions and its role, it is quite stark and well put. It says “Russia has breached the values...broken the trust...and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture.” Now nice words are one thing, but this was backed up by actions. Some of the steps that we have already heard discussed have changed the deterrence equation in conventional terms in Europe.

But that is not the only challenge we face. Russia, for many years, has tried to exert influence on the political direction and developments in NATO itself and in some NATO member states. We are recognizing this more fully in the United States now.

If we look to the future, we should expect Russia to attempt to influence other election processes and state actions, regardless of whether there is an election happening in a particular country or not. So if we look at that clear Warsaw statement about how Russia’s aggressive actions have changed the security environment and the measures to deal with it, I think the priority should be a shared transatlantic recognition of the attempts by Russia to exert influence on our politics. That means a recognition that this is happening, and that we cannot see it separately from Russia’s military pressure on the transatlantic community and its aggression in Ukraine. It means a clear statement that there will be consequences if that behavior continues. And from that recognition would flow elements of a transatlantic agenda that includes the European Union as well as NATO, because Dan was absolutely right that there are things NATO does well, and there are certain things NATO does less well, and we should not ask it to do the things it not well set up to do.

But I think this will involve several things. It will involve cybersecurity, it will involve economic statecraft, which includes cooperation and harmonization on things such as economic sanctions, it will involve transparency and media freedom issues, and a whole host of steps that will help reinforce the integrity of our democracies, which are the fundamental thing we are protecting, as Kurt laid out. So I will stop there and hand the microphone over, but I think that is where the focus needs to be.
What is this new security environment? After decades of peace in Europe, we see that Russia has invaded two of its neighbors and brought back interstate war to the continent. As you have heard already, NATO responded to this in 2014 at the Wales summit, and this summer at the Warsaw summit by taking some very important decisions. And while I agree that these steps NATO has taken so far are helpful and good, I also see that these steps have been insufficient, and that they have not restored deterrence to Europe. I see a strategic gap in Europe between the limited steps that NATO has taken so far and the more robust measures that need to be taken to restore security in Europe. The source of this strategic gap for NATO is that too many NATO leaders are failing to understand three key changes that have taken place in the European security environment. To put it simply, NATO’s response so far has been too slow and too small. NATO leaders, quite a few of them, want the alliance to act as if this is 1997, and they are very unwilling to let NATO act to face the real threat it is facing in at this time.

These new threats come in three different changes. These are the changes in NATO’s geography, the changes in the technology that NATO is facing, and the changes in the nature of the threat that NATO is facing. I believe that if we invest a little bit of time in understanding these threats, we will see why NATO needs to have more robust response to aggression in Europe, and what are some of these additional steps that need to be taken.

The first change is the change in the geography. Many are familiar with the map that we used to call the layered cake. You saw large deployment of NATO troops from the United States and other nations in West Germany. What you saw here is sort of the geographic environment and view that NATO leaders are trying to avoid. They do not want to have large troop deployments, but at the same time they failed to understand that as NATO’s borders have moved east, there are certain key geostrategic changes that have happened apart from the troop deployments. During the Cold War, the zone of friction between NATO and its main external threat was based on one of the four largest NATO members, West Germany. And this NATO member was backed up by other NATO members with significant military capabilities – France, Belgium, and Netherlands – and by forward deployments of significant assets from other allies, such as Canada and United States.

The new security environment we see now is very different. As NATO’s borders have moved east, now we see a new zone of friction. This includes the provocations that we have seen from the Russians: their military aircraft flying without transponders on, violations of NATO airspace, and of the sea space of some of the nonaligned countries in the region. So we see that there is greater friction and interaction between hostile external forces and the NATO forces in the northeast. But in addition to that, the NATO members that are most vulnerable are not only the most geographically farthest away from the core of NATO, but they are also geographically some of the smallest in the alliance. So it is a very different dynamic than what we had in the Cold War. And while in the Cold War West Germany did lack strategic depth, this problem has been
exacerbated and is even greater now with the small geographic territory of the Baltic republics.

When we are dealing with a change in technology, we can look at some of what are called Anti-Access/Area Denial Sites in the West. Most of you have probably seen maps that focus on the capabilities from Kaliningrad and Crimea, perhaps even the new A2/AD zone in the eastern Mediterranean and Syria. But we also have to remember that Russia has very significant capabilities in St. Petersburg that cover the eastern Baltic as well as in Murmansk that cover areas of the Arctic Circle. With these you can see there is quite a bit of range. With this new technology and these weapons, NATO is now facing a situation where if you talk to senior NATO military leaders, they describe NATO airspace now as contested, as well as NATO sea space. This means even now, in a pre-conflict state, the number of NATO military and naval aircraft that go in can easily be pressured, as we have seen by some of the flybys of the Russian military aircraft over US military ships in the Baltic sea. This changes the dynamic and puts greater emphasis on the need for forward deployed forces.

Also, the capabilities in Kaliningrad, one of the most geographically invasive parts of Russian military capabilities in NATO airspace. From Kaliningrad, and some other capabilities you saw earlier in Belarus, they cover the area of access between Lithuania and Poland. And with the addition, as we have heard the recent news of Iskander missiles deployed into Kaliningrad, with their range, it is possible to range even as far west as Berlin. Those were just some of the land capabilities of the new Russian military technology. These are some of the maritime capabilities of Russia’s new missiles. These are some of the Kalibr missiles that would have been disclosed. Two new ships having these Kalibr missiles have been deployed to the Baltic Sea fleet for Russia now. These were the same type of Kalibr missiles that were launched from the Caspian Sea to hit Russian targets in Syria. Russia had aircraft in Syria at the time. It did not need to use this capability, but it went out of its way to launch missiles from the Caspian Sea to demonstrate the range and precision of this aircraft. In addition to this, Russia has also deployed Russian bombers from the base we saw in Murmansk all across Western Europe, through the Straits of Gibraltar, into the Mediterranean, just to launch cruise missiles into Syria. Again, Russia had capabilities in Syria already, it did not need to do that. Moscow chose to use those capabilities to show it could demonstrate going around Western Europe, and the range of its military options.

And then very briefly, to discuss the change in the nature of the threat NATO is facing. It is true and it is a fact, Russia is a much weaker power militarily than the Soviet Union was, but at the same time, it is also true and a fact that Russia remains and has a quantifiable military superiority over all its neighbors to the west and to the south.

Russia wants its neighbors weak and unstable, so it can coerce them, influence them, and shape their patterns. But we can also look at some of the largest military powers in Europe including Germany, France, and United Kingdom. And we see that even they do not match up directly to Russia. This helps us understand why Putin’s strategies and his tactics are consistently to lean on European countries and on even NATO members bilaterally, one-on-one, to separate them from the rest of the continent and from the rest of their alliances, and to apply pressure and threats to them to make
them feel intimidated. This has happened not just with Russian threats to Sweden and Finland, from military leaders, from political leaders threatening them not to join NATO or there will be repercussions. Russia’s ambassador in Copenhagen threatened Denmark, a NATO member, that its ships would face nuclear targeting from Russian vessels if Denmark contributed to the NATO missile defense system.

Now, Russia is not the only threat that NATO is facing, and the threats that NATO is facing are not just conventional. Another significant part of the conventional threat is the GIUK gap. Russia has deployed a far greater number of submarines in the North Atlantic. And again, with their technology, they are much quieter than we have ever faced before. CNO Admiral Richardson has expressed great concern about the ability of the United States to move through the contested sea space of the North Atlantic. This is one of the reasons why Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work visited Iceland, and the United States is committed to reopening our base in Keflavík and positioning P-3 Orion anti-submarine helicopters there.

In addition to that we have threats from the south. We have migrants, an unprecedented level of human movement from North Africa and Middle East into Europe. In addition to that, we also have terrorism. Now, for many NATO allies the Russian threat is the main threat. There are also key NATO allies, such as France and Belgium that see terrorism as their number one national security priority and the main threat to their countries. While the terrorists that attacked Paris were less than dozen in number, they may be perhaps the most successful pinning force in military history, because those dozen terrorists are holding down 7,000 French troops that are deployed domestically in French cities for counter-terrorism operations rather than being available for other French military or NATO missions.

On top of that, we have a very robust hybrid warfare campaign being waged by Russia, not just in the gray zone against nonaligned countries, but also within NATO capitals. We have seen references to some of the incidents of this, such as DNC hacks against the United States. This is not an isolated incident; we have seen several of these types of attacks in NATO territory. British intelligence stated that in 2015 it foiled a significant cyber attack against British elections. German intelligence talks about the increase in Russian spies and their attempts to influence German public opinion. These are things that the alliance is facing all across, and needs a much stronger response.

So, as you have heard earlier, there have been some key deliverables from summits, some of the major steps. NATO has prepared eight forced integration units. These are command cells of about 40 personnel: 20 from NATO, 20 from the host country. They are good, they are helpful, but again, they are limited. They are to help NATO plan more NATO exercises and to also facilitate the deployment of some of these other forces that were agreed upon at Wales and Warsaw.

So Wales, NATO just had the NATO response force, which was supposed to be the rapid reaction force for alliance, but alliance leaders saw the speed with which Russia acted in Ukraine was much faster than capabilities that the alliance had. So they almost tripled the size of the NATO response force, and increased it so that the NATO response force should now in theory be deployable within 30 days. But even that was not considered to be quick enough, so NATO created VJTF (Very high readiness Joint
Task Force), a smaller unit of about 5,000 troops, light infantry, that should be able to be deployed within two to seven days, the first units of about 1,500 troops in two days and the rest of the 5,000 within seven days.

At Warsaw, we saw some more significant steps taken, the most famous of which have been the EFP, Enhanced Forward Presence, the four battalions deployed in the east, which we will go into a little bit deeper. In addition to that we must also remember that through President Obama’s European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), the United States is also putting a third brigade combat team in Europe on a rotational basis. We are also seeing greater deployments in the Black Sea region with the UK, Canada, and Poland pledging to send some fighters for rotational exercises, which the alliance sometimes called Black Sea Air Policing, but they will be there a very limited time.

Some details of the four battalions going into NATO’s northeast: These are the ones that Russia is making a big issue of, and even NATO itself I feel is exaggerating the extent to which this military capability can help. As you can see, in each of the Baltic countries and in Poland there will be a battalion. These battalions will be roughly about 1,000 troops. They will be led by one nation, which NATO refers to as a framework nation. In addition to that, other countries will contribute smaller-size units to that. What this means basically is that, except for the United States, which will be mostly close to 1,000 troops, most of the other battalions deployed, even the framework nation, will not deploy close to 1,000, but probably half or a little more, 500 to 700 of the troops, and the rest of the battalion will be provided by some of the other nations. NATO, I think, is very confident and is claiming credit for participation of 20 countries in the Enhanced Forward Presence. I think it is good to have that type of political solidarity militarily, though as a strategist, I am concerned that it takes 20 countries for NATO to scrape together 4,000 troops.

And the reason why I am concerned about the size of it is this: this a response to Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine. After Wales, NATO created and expanded the size of the NRF, and created the VJTF, about 5,000. After Warsaw, NATO is deploying east 4,000 troops in these battalions. Before NATO announced this decision at the Warsaw summit in July, as far back as January the Russians announced they were going to add three divisions to their western military district. Since then, they have changed those numbers. They are adding two divisions or about 20,000 troops to the western military district, and the third division has been reassigned to the southern military district, which is the one closest to Ukrainian border.

So to put it very briefly, I see that NATO has some key challenges, some key vulnerabilities, and these are size, which you saw in the previous charts; speed, which requires two different types of speed; and readiness.

In terms of speed, NATO needs to improve its political decision-making speed, because none of these troops are going to move until NATO provides political approval for them. Also, even once that very difficult hurdle that NATO has been wrestling with over two years is overcome, we still have military speed. The actual deployability of these troops, which leads to what I consider NATO’s main Achilles heel, is a very serious readiness problem all across the alliance. NATO does not have sufficient military capabilities to face the threat that it is seeing from Russia. But even if it had
it, the problem is more severe. Not only does it not have capabilities. Of the 
capabilities that NATO thinks it has on paper, it has far fewer of them. More 
significantly, we see this in Germany in the case of the Bundeswehr, where they have 
far fewer combat planes than they had before. Even of the ones that remain, about 
half of them are not combat ready. But this is not isolated just to Germany; the 
readiness problem is all across the alliance. For example, in Great Britain, the Royal 
Navy with its illustrious career, has more admirals than it has combat ships. The 
French as we talked about are overstretched, not just with the counter-terrorism 
movement in Operation Sentinel, but also with their counter-terrorism efforts in the 
southern Sahel region in Africa, in Mali, in the Central African Republic. And in the 
United States, because of sequester, the commander of EUCOM had to ground 25 
percent of our fighter aircraft because there was not enough funding for them.

Lastly, just a basic comparison of where we are now. The current NATO approach I 
describe as cheap deterrence; I see a strong aversion among too many political NATO 
leaders to take political risk or to spend a lot of money to actually deal with the threat 
that we are facing. As a result of that, every time Russia acts and creates a 
provocation to the west, we have a very muted response. Too often this means a 
bilateral response. There is a lack of political deterrence within the alliance. When 
Russia pushes one of our allies or one of our partners in Europe, I think there needs 
to be a multinational diplomatic response. This will reinforce our military deterrence. 
Likewise, I think NATO is taking too long to resolve the decision-making problem. I 
think it needs to remember that it has already delegated in the past authority to 
SACEUR during the Cold War and to SACEUR and the Secretary-General during 
Balkans conflict. NATO needs to return to these things and not think it is reinventing 
the wheel. Also, I think we need to see a change from basic defense budget planning 
among alliances. There are too many free riders in Europe, but at the same time I feel 
that Washington is enabling this because we are undertaking too many unilateral 
actions. I feel that already after two rounds of ERI, the United States has put money 
on the table. According to the NATO Secretary-General’s report, NATO defense 
spending grew in the past year by over $3 billion, over our European and Canadian 
allies. ERI itself is $3.4 billion, which is a significantly large number. So they are 
spending more on their national defense, but not committing more to NATO missions. 
I feel that before a third ERI is approved or recommended by the next U.S. 
administration, it needs to be a multilateral ERI, one in which the United States and 
our allies both put capabilities on the field.
Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)
Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)
Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)
Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

International Advisory and Research Council

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